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MAINE’S FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM:
WHAT SHOULD CONSTITUTE A GOOD FAITH
EFFORT TO MEDIATE?
By Jesse D. Stewart*
I. INTRODUCTION
The collapse of the housing bubble and subsequent financial downturn of 2008
unleashed a flood of foreclosure filings in the Maine courts, threatening the
fundamental aspiration of homeownership for many Maine residents. This
Comment examines the significant steps Maine has taken to address increased
foreclosure filings through the implementation of a foreclosure mediation program
and offers concrete suggestions to further improve the program. In Part II, this
Comment traces some of the relevant mortgage lending practices that preceded the
present crisis and continue to affect the parties’ abilities to achieve negotiated
agreements in mediation. Part III examines how the Maine Legislature and
Judiciary have responded to the increase in foreclosure filings, with a primary
focus on the Legislature’s authorization of the Foreclosure Diversion Program
(“FDP”), which includes a mandate that both the borrower and lender make a
“good faith effort” to mediate prior to seeking summary judgment. In examining
Maine’s response to the increase in foreclosure filings, this Comment reviews
several recent Maine Supreme Judicial Court decisions on foreclosure issues that
are illustrative of the Court’s current stance toward some of the procedural aspects
of foreclosure law that inevitably bear on the strength of the parties’ respective
bargaining positions at mediation. Part IV analyzes the results of the FDP’s first
full year of operation in light of the FDP’s stated objective of maximizing fairness
and efficiency in foreclosure actions. This Comment argues that two significant
challenges to achieving the FDP objectives are (1) the documentation issues
evidenced by the high incidence of unsuccessful summary judgment motions filed
by the foreclosing party and (2) the overwhelming pro se status of foreclosure
defendants. Part V argues that, given the current landscape of foreclose practices
in Maine and the positive results of the mediation program, mediation can be
further encouraged by broadly interpreting the good faith requirement. By strictly
enforcing the good faith requirement and setting clear, reasonable expectations for
the parties’ conduct at mediation, the FDP can increase the incidence of negotiated
agreements at mediation and contribute to avoiding the unsuccessful summary
judgment motions that have plagued the foreclosing parties, threatened the integrity
of the foreclosure process, and wasted court resources by unnecessarily delaying
the resolution of mortgage defaults.

* J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Maine School of Law. I would like to thank Professors
Melvyn Zarr and David Cluchey, and attorneys Chet Randall and Thomas Cox for their valuable
suggestions and assistance in writing this Comment. All errors and views expressed are my own.
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II. A BRIEF BACKGROUND
A. Nicolle Bradbury and the Robo-Signer: A Snapshot of Maine’s Foreclosure
Landscape
On October 14, 2010, the front page of the New York Times displayed a picture
of a modest Maine home under the title “From a Maine House, a National
Foreclosure Freeze.”1 In what has now become a familiar story for many, Nicolle
Bradbury purchased her home for $ 75,000 in 2003, which allowed her to move out
of the trailer she had been living in with her family.2 She financed the home with a
mortgage loan she was offered by GMAC Mortgage.3 For three years, Mrs.
Bradbury made the $ 474 monthly payments on her home until she lost her job as
an employment counselor in 2006.4 Although she worked odd jobs in an attempt to
make ends meet, her husband was in poor health and unable to work, and Mrs.
Bradbury fell behind on her payments.5 GMAC agreed to modify her payment
obligations, but this only increased her monthly payments, and by 2008 Mrs.
Bradbury had stopped making the payments altogether.6 When GMAC attempted
to foreclose on the home, Mrs. Bradbury sought a pro bono attorney.7 Thomas
Cox, an attorney for Maine Attorney’s Saving Homes (“MASH”), a joint project of
Pine Tree Legal Assistance (“PTLA”) and the Maine Volunteer Lawyers Project
(“VLP”), took Mrs. Bradbury’s case.8 MASH coordinates pro-bono referrals for
low-income clients facing foreclosure.9
Mr. Cox’s subsequent representation of Mrs. Bradbury revealed the fraudulent
practices of Jeffery Stephan, the “limited signing officer” and signatory of the
affidavit upon which GMAC relied in asking the Maine District Court to foreclose
on the house at summary judgment.10 Indeed, the signing officer admitted in a
deposition that he had signed hundreds of similar affidavits every day without any
personal knowledge of the contents of the documents he was signing although the
affidavits all averred that he had personally reviewed each individual file.11 Thus,
1. David Streitfeld, From a Maine House, a National Foreclosure Freeze, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2010, at A1 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/business/15maine.html.
2. Id.
3. Id. GMAC Mortgage is a wholly owned subsidiary of Ally Financial, Inc. About GMAC
Mortgage, GMAC MORTGAGE, http://www.gmacmortgage.com/about.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
GMAC started out financing consumer auto loans but has since diversified to include home mortgages,
among other financial services. See The Ally Story, ALLY FIN., http://www.ally.com/about/ally-story
(last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
4. Streitfeld, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Foreclosed Justice: Causes and Effects of the Foreclosure Crisis (Part I & II): Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 293 (2010) [hereinafter Foreclosed Justice], available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-158_62935.PDF (statement by Thomas Cox,
Esquire, Volunteer Program Coordinator, Maine Attorneys Saving Homes Project).
9. Me. Atty’s Saving Homes, ME. VOLUNTEER LAWYERS PROJECT, http://www.vlp.org/maineattorneys-saving-homes-mash (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
10. See Streitfeld, supra note 1.
11. See Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc. v. Bradbury, No. RE-09-65, at 4 (Me. Dist. Ct., Bridgton, Sept. 24,
2010) (Powers, J.), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/FourMotionsOrder.
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as Mr. Cox later stated in testimony to the House Judiciary Committee: “When [the
signing officer] says that he has custody and control of the loan documents, he
doesn’t. When he says that he is attaching ‘a true and accurate’ copy of a note or a
mortgage, he has no idea if that is so because he does not look at the exhibits.”12
The Maine District Court (Bridgton, Powers, J.) found that this “unlawful conduct”
was not isolated but rather had persisted for years and was a “serious and troubling
matter.”13 As a result, the court reversed summary judgment for the foreclosing
party and granted Mrs. Bradbury’s motion for sanctions, awarding Mrs. Bradbury
attorney’s fees.14 The Bradbury case triggered national media attention, and within
a month major mortgage holders such as GMAC, Bank of America, JP Morgan
Chase, and others announced a temporary foreclosure freeze based on potential
documentation problems in twenty-three states where the foreclosing party must go
to court to prove foreclosure.15
Mrs. Bradbury’s case is quite unusual in the national media attention it
garnered, and in her ability, through assistance from pro bono counsel, to remain in
her home long after default and the mortgagee’s motion for summary judgment.
Indeed, over ninety percent of Maine homeowners facing foreclosure and in need
of legal assistance are unable to retain counsel,16 and seventy percent of
homeowners fail to contest the foreclosing party’s motion for summary judgment,
which only increases the likelihood that the foreclosing party will obtain the
property absent the full rigor of the adversary system at summary judgment.17
Thus, it is quite possible that had Mrs. Bradbury failed to contact legal assistance
and Mr. Cox, she would have been just another victim of foreclosure.
Mrs. Bradbury’s case symbolizes the upswing in foreclosures in Maine over
the last several years.18 In fact, in June 2009, the Maine Judicial Branch
Commission on Foreclosure Diversion (the Commission)19 released a report noting
pdf. For a thorough explanation of the sorts of practices in which these signing officers engaged, see
Onewest Bank, F.S.B. v. Drayton, 910 N.Y.S. 2d 857, 861-66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
12. Foreclosed Justice, supra note 8, at 297.
13. Bradbury, RE-09-65, at 5.
14. Id. at 2, 5. On appeal, the Law Court rejected Bradbury’s contention that the trial court should
have held GMAC in contempt in addition to imposing sanctions. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc. v. Bradbury,
2011 ME 120, ___A.3d ___.
15. Streitfeld, supra note 1. However, the banks have since resumed processing foreclosures
despite investigations into improper practices in mortgage servicing by all fifty state attorneys general.
See Nelson D. Schwartz & Andrew Martin, Largest Bank will Resume Foreclosure Push in 23 States,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2010, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/business/ 19mortgage.html. A
number of major lending institutions have also reached a settlement agreement with federal investigators
in relation to lender misconduct. See Dina ElBoghdady, Regulators, Mortgage Servicers Agree on
Reforms, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ business/economy/regulatorsmortgage-services-agree-on-reforms/2011/04/13/AFtQxsWD_story.html.
16. Foreclosed Justice, supra note 8, at 294.
17. See STATE OF ME. JUDICIAL BRANCH, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH COMM. ON
FORECLOSURE DIVERSION 18 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 JUD. BRANCH REP.], available at
http://www.courts.state.me.us/rules_forms_fees/fdc_report0609.pdf.
18. See id. at 4.
19. The Commission was formed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in March 2009. See
Commission on Foreclosure Diversion, ME. JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.me.us/
committees/foreclosure.html (last visited Sept 7, 2011). The Commission was tasked with proposing an
“effective alternative dispute resolution process” to “promote prompt and fair resolutions” in foreclosure
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that while foreclosures in Maine had not been as high as in some states hardest hit
by the foreclosure crisis, Maine “is nonetheless experiencing unprecedented rates
of foreclosures, particularly in those loans held by national lenders.”20 A Judicial
Branch Report submitted to the Maine Legislature noted that “[f]oreclosure filing
activity remained high” in 2010, reaching 5409 total filings.21 Most recently,
Maine banking regulators have indicated that completed foreclosures remain high,
although foreclosure starts have declined.22 Meanwhile, in addressing this increase
in foreclosures, the Commission has identified one of the inherent difficulties
created by the foreclosure crisis, observing that the “current rise in foreclosures
represents a lose-lose situation because lenders incur increased transaction costs
and reduced return from their collateral, and homeowners lose their homes.
Additionally, communities lose as they suffer from the associated consequences of
the proceedings.”23 To understand this situation better, it is helpful to understand
the practices and principles that underlie the current foreclosure crisis.
B. Homeownership, Securitization, and Subprime Lending
Home ownership has been at the center of our policy priorities in the United
States throughout the last century and is closely associated with representations of
the American Dream.24 Because home ownership would be an impossible dream
for most families absent mortgage loans,25 government policies encouraging a wide
availability of credit, including the broad use of “creative financing,” have
significantly fueled home ownership rates.26 At the same time, economic highs and
proceedings. Id. The Commission is composed of representatives from all three branches of state
government as well as practitioners representing the interests of various stakeholders, including those of
lenders and legal services organizations. See 2009 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 17, at 38.
20. 2009 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 17, at 6-7. The report also notes that most data on the rate
of foreclosure filings does not distinguish between commercial and residential mortgages, yet the report
indicates that according to anecdotal evidence, the vast majority of foreclosures in Maine are residential
(as much as ninety-seven percent). See id. at 7 n.1 (citation to footnote only).
21. STATE OF ME. JUDICIAL BRANCH FORECLOSURE DIVERSION PROGRAM, REPORT TO THE JOINT
STANDING COMM. ON INS. AND FIN. SERVS., 125th Legis., at 2 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 JUD. BRANCH
REP.], available at http://www.courts.state.me.us/publications_other/fdp_2010_ar.pdf. The first page of
this document as available on the State website is unnumbered with the second page numbered as 1.
The page references in this Comment follow this convention.
22 Maine Foreclosure Picture Mixed, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Dec. 28, 2011, available at
http://bangordailynews.com/2011/12/28/business/maine-foreclosure-picture-mixed/.
23. 2009 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 17, at 8.
24. See Kristen David Adams, Home Ownership: American Dream or Illusion of Empowerment?,
60 S.C. L. REV. 573, 574 (2009). Adams notes that United States Presidents from Franklin Delano
Roosevelt and Herbert Hoover to George W. Bush and Bill Clinton have endorsed this priority. See id.
574-75. See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT HOUSING REPORTS, H121-03-1, MOVING TO
AMERICA--MOVING TO HOMEOWNERSHIP: 1994-2002, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2003pubs/h121-03-1.pdf (“For many people, whether native or foreign born, homeownership is
their American dream.”).
25. Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 3 (2011).
26. Adams, supra note 24, at 587 (noting that home ownership rose in the United States from sixtythree percent in the early nineties to sixty-nine percent at its peak in 2005). See also Grant S. Nelson,
Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure
Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 583, 584, 594 (2010) (discussing Federal Reserve policies meant to hold down
interest rates as well as “[a] variety of government-sponsored institutions . . . [that] purchase large
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lows are recurrent, and the history of the United States has been “characterized by
the ebb and flow of credit availability, coincident with economic boom and bust
cycles.”27 The distinct elements that have defined our systems of governance and
credit in the United States over the last century, including the enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code and abolishment of restrictive usury statutes, have
provided for an “unprecedented convergence of the required elements that helped
to create a fifty year credit and economic boom.”28 However, most recently, this
credit boom has brought serious consequences, creating what one congressional
panel concluded was a “foreclosure crisis unprecedented since the Great
Depression.”29
Many factors have contributed to the crisis, including the rise in available lowcost capital resulting in increased pressure on investors to obtain a return on that
capital;30 Federal Reserve Bank (“FRB”) monetary policy;31 and the rapid growth
of subprime lending practices since the early nineties, which in turn was fueled by
deregulation of the banking industry and securitization.32 Insofar as these factors
increased home ownership opportunities, they were aligned with Congress’s
longtime preference for “low interest rates, expanded home ownership, increasing
asset prices, and widespread credit availability.”33 Congressional reports since the
housing bubble burst have largely blamed federal policies.34 As one report stated:
blocks of mortgages from local lenders and thus greatly expand the amount of money available for
housing purchases,” as two contributing factors to increased home ownership).
27. Alvin C. Harrell, The Great Credit Contraction: Who, What, When, Where and Why, 26 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1209, 1212 (2010).
28. Id. at 1212-13.
29. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF
FORECLOSURE MITIGATION EFFORTS AFTER SIX MONTHS 5 (Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter COP
FORECLOSURE REP.], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT52671/html/CPRT111JPRT52671.pdf.
30. See Brent J. Horton, In Defense of Private-Label Mortgage-Backed Securities, 61 FLA. L. REV.
827, 830 (2009); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198-99 (2008)
(discussing the relationship between capital costs and systemic risk); Heather M. Tashman, The
Subprime Lending Industry: An Industry in Crisis, 124 BANKING L.J. 407, 410 (2007) (discussing the
growth of securitization and subprime lending).
31. See Harrell, supra note 27, at 1214. See also Peter L. Cockrell, Comment, Subprime Solutions
to the Housing Crisis: Constitutional Problems with the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of
2009, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1149, 1149 (2010) (“[T]he origins of the recent bubble can be traced
back to the moral hazard created by the government’s bailout of financial institutions during the S&L
crisis and of Long Term Capital Management in 1998, as well as two decades of the Federal Reserve’s
loose monetary policy.”).
32. Tashman, supra note 30, at 410 (“According to The Department of Housing and Urban
Development . . . the subprime lending industry has grown from $35 billion in 1994 to $650 billion
today.”).
33. Harrell, supra note 27, at 1216.
34. See STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 111TH CONG., THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT AFFORDABLE HOUSING POLICY IN CREATING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008, at
2 (2010) [hereinafter H.R. COMM. REP. ON FIN. CRISIS], available at http://oversight.house.gov/
images/stories/Reports/20100512affordablehousingpolicyandthefinancialcrisis.pdf. See also generally
JOINT ECON. COMM., GOVERNMENT POLICY BLUNDERS LARGELY CAUSED THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS, RES. REP. NO. 110-26 (2008), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/Research
Reports/2008/rr110-26doc.pdf (blaming government policies, including the unintended consequences of
certain financial regulations and housing policies).
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The housing bubble that burst in 2007 and led to a financial crisis can be traced
back to federal government intervention in the U.S. housing market intended to
help provide homeownership opportunities for more Americans. This intervention
began with two government-backed corporations, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
which privatized their profits but socialized their risks [through securitization],
creating powerful incentives for them to act recklessly and exposing taxpayers to
tremendous losses. Government intervention also created “affordable” but
dangerous lending policies which encouraged lower down payments, looser
underwriting standards and higher leverage. Finally, government intervention
created a nexus of vested interests – politicians, lenders and lobbyists – who
profited from the “affordable” housing market and acted to kill reforms. In the
short run, this government intervention was successful in its stated goal – raising
the national homeownership rate. However, the ultimate effect was to create a
mortgage tsunami that wrought devastation on the American people and economy.
While government intervention was not the sole cause of the financial crisis, its
35
role was significant . . . .

It is widely accepted that the rapid growth of the subprime lending market has been
at the very heart of this crisis,36 and to understand the legal and policy issues
involved, it is necessary to understand the nature of mortgage securitization and
subprime lending.
The idea of offering a secondary market for loans is not new.37 For example,
Congress created Fannie Mae in 1938, during the Franklin Delano Roosevelt
Administration, to jump-start the faltering lending market after the Great
Depression by offering lenders an immediate way to recover their loan investment
by selling their loans to Fannie Mae.38 During Roosevelt’s time, Fannie Mae
would hold the loan purchased from the original lender until it was fully repaid,
theoretically allowing the bank to turn around and re-loan that money, thus
expanding loan availability.39 It was not until the 1970’s, after the creation of
Freddie Mac, that Fannie and Freddie began securitizing conventional (nonsubprime) loans purchased from the original lenders.40 Securitization has now
become standard practice upon origination of the majority of mortgage loans,
where approximately sixty-five percent of all residential mortgages are currently
securitized, and in 2009, nearly ninety percent of all first-lien residential mortgages
were securitized after origination.41 The size and growth of the securities market is
evidenced by the existence of $6.97 trillion in outstanding residential mortgage
backed securities by the end of 2009.42
Securitization today typically refers to the process by which an investment

35. H.R. COMM. REP. ON FIN. CRISIS, supra note 34, at 2.
36. See Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage
Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (2010).
37. See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2193
(2007) (noting that early “efforts to form a secondary market came out of private mortgage companies
which, by the 1880s, were making mortgage loans around the country through local agents.”).
38. Id. at 2196.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2199.
41. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 25, at 12.
42. Id. at 16.
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bank or its subsidiary purchases an individual mortgage loan from the mortgage
originator43 and combines or pools a number of these loans into securities.44 The
loans are then transferred into a trust created to hold hundreds of other similar
loans, and the trust resells pieces of itself to investors.45 To facilitate this sale, an
underwriter will typically purchase all the securities (i.e. the income streams
generated by the monthly loan payments) arising out of the trust pool.46 The
underwriter will then work closely with a credit rating agency to sell the securities
to individual investors,47 enhancing the pools’ creditworthiness by “tranching” the
securities into tiered senior-subordinate repayment structures.48 The rating agency,
in theory, investigates the underlying mortgages and rates the risk that the
individual borrowers will fail to repay the loan.49 In order to obtain a sufficiently
favorable credit rating to interest investors, some less credit-worthy tranches may
be insured against default.50 In addition, the entity selling the securities will
generally contract away the right to service the loan to a servicing company,
including granting the servicer the power to foreclose on the mortgage if
necessary.51
Finally, many lenders pay the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc.
(MERS),52 a Delaware corporation headquartered in Virginia, to maintain a
computer database that tracks ownership rights of mortgage loans issued around the
country.53 Lenders and loan servicers pay MERS dues to maintain this database,
which members can access.54 The individual members, who are not MERS
employees, input assignments of the mortgage into the MERS database.55 MERS
does not verify the accuracy of this data.56 Meanwhile, MERS records each
mortgage as the lender’s nominee of record in the local property recorder’s
registry.57 Thus, MERS’s name, rather than the lender’s name, appears on the
registry, despite the fact that MERS does not “solicit, fund, service, or actually own
any mortgage loans.”58 Nevertheless, MERS purports to remain the mortgagee for
the life of the mortgage loan, while generally the lender will pool the loans for
43. In many cases, the originator, or original lender, is represented by a broker who is paid to
market the loan products to the consumer.
44. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 25, at 13.
45. Peterson, supra note 37, at 2209.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 25, at 15 (diagramming a typical securitization structure).
The intricacies of tranching are beyond the scope of this Comment. For a more complete explanation of
tranching, see id. at 21 as well as Peterson, supra note 37, at 2203.
49. Peterson, supra note 37, at 2209-10.
50. Id. at 2210.
51. Id.
52. Leading up to the 2008 crisis, MERS was legally involved in the origination of sixty percent of
all mortgage loans in the United States. Peterson, supra note 36, at 1362.
53. Id. at 1361.
54. Id.
55. Deposition of William Hultman at 127, Bank of New York v. Ukpe, No. F-10209-08 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div., Apr. 7, 2010) (on file with author).
56. Id.
57. Peterson, supra note 36, at 1361.
58. Id.
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securitization.59 In so doing, MERS, in its own words, “simplifies the way
mortgage ownership and servicing rights are originated, sold and tracked” by
eliminating “the need to prepare and record assignments when trading residential
and commercial mortgage loans.”60
However, MERS has also been criticized for contributing to the mortgage
lending meltdown insofar as it lowered exit costs for loan originators by providing
a “super-generic placeholder” for originators of sometimes questionable integrity,
thereby abetting “fly by night” mortgage financing61 and undermining the
transparency of local property recording systems by developing a private database
of mortgage loan transactions which is unavailable to the public.62 This in turn
makes it more difficult to determine the underlying owner of the loan, creating
“commercial uncertainty” and “inefficient litigation.”63 Finally, as one MERS
senior vice-president has acknowledged, “MERS is owned and operated by and for
the mortgage industry,” which makes MERS’s business model a unilateral industry
attempt to effectively undermine longstanding local property recording laws
without clear legislative authorization.64 As discussed below, MERS’s ambiguous
relationship to the loan has come under sharp scrutiny in the Maine Courts, and has
contributed to litigation uncertainty in the state.65
Although MERS tracks the ownership rights of the loan, the loan servicer
generally manages the pooled loans for the benefit of the investors in the trust.66
Most loans that are securitized have a servicer, which is often a separate corporate
entity from the originator of the loan or the security trust.67 The servicer sends out
monthly bills and collects payments on the loans.68 The servicer is also responsible
for responding to loans in default, including prosecuting foreclosures, mitigating
investor loss, and pursing repayment of mortgage loans to the trust.69 In addition,
several different servicers often serve one trust throughout the life of the loan,
where each servicer may address different specialized servicing responsibilities.70
Over half of the mortgages serviced in the United States rely on Loan
Processing Services’ Mortgage Servicing Platform (MSP), which automates many
of the servicing tasks, including default and foreclosure procedures.71 When MSP
software detects a sixty-day payment delinquency, the servicer enters a code into
the system, which triggers an automatic referral and document transfer process,
directing the receiving attorney to perform specific tasks on a predetermined
timeline.72 Thus, as one court noted, MSP “supports all mortgage servicing
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1361-62.
MERS, http://www.mersinc.org (last visited Sept. 8, 2011).
Peterson, supra note 36, at 1398 (emphasis omitted).
See id. at 1403.
Id.
Id. at 1405-06.
See infra Part III.C.
Levitin & Twomey, supra note 25, at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 27.
Id.
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functional areas within one comprehensive system, including comprehensive
default functionality for collections work queue, foreclosure, bankruptcy and REO
[real estate owned] management.”73 This system may maximize efficiency under
certain conditions, but it also creates a business model that operates with “virtually
no discretion or oversight.”74 In contrast, when a default occurs, negotiated
solutions that avoid foreclosure require significant personal attention in order to
“contact borrowers, collect and verify data, obtain home value estimates, determine
whether the borrower has suffered a temporary or permanent setback, coordinate
actions with second-lien holders, and calculate net present value estimates of loss
mitigation alternatives.”75 Initiating a foreclosure action, however, is largely
automated.76 Thus, from a corporate efficiency standpoint, foreclosure is the
automated default setting for many servicers, while a negotiated solution may
require an entirely different business approach that falls outside the normal
functions offered by the software.
In addition, the servicers’ contractual compensation generally “incentivizes
servicers to aggressively pursue ancillary fees and to pursue loss mitigation
strategies that minimize costs, even if they fail to maximize returns to investors.”77
In fact, mortgage documents generally provide for the servicer to retain late fees
and collection costs, including those fees associated with prosecuting the
foreclosure and property maintenance after the foreclosure has occurred.78 These
fees represent a crucial portion of the servicers’ income,79 which may create
incentives for less scrupulous servicers to charge illegal fees.80 Such fee structures
create perverse incentives for services to avoid rapid resolution to a default where
prolonging the period between default and foreclosure may allow for increased fee
collection, and simply doing nothing minimizes transaction costs to the servicer.81
Furthermore, although servicers are generally reimbursed for their foreclosure
costs, modification costs are generally not covered.82 When reimbursements are
available, they are paid off the top of foreclosure sales, thus minimizing the
servicer’s incentive to maximize the value of the foreclosure sale.83 This creates a
principal-agent conflict between trustees and servicers, as “servicers’ incentives in
managing a loan diverge from [those] of investors.”84 According to one scholar,
this creates three problems:
First, servicers are incentivized to pad the costs of handling defaulted loans at the
expense of investors and borrowers. Second, servicers are not incentivized to
73. In re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618, 624 n.9 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009).
74. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 25, at 28.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 37.
78. Id. at 41.
79. See id. at 42.
80. See id. at 43. See also generally Complaint, State v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No.
2010-3307 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug. 30, 2010); Complaint, Walton v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re
Atchley), No. 08-6092 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2008).
81. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 25, at 45.
82. Id. at 46.
83. Id. at 47.
84. Id. at 69.
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maximize the net present value of a loan, but are instead incentivized to drag out
defaults . . . . In other words, servicers are incentivized to keep defaulted
homeowners in a fee sweatbox, rather than moving to immediately foreclose on
the loan. Third, servicers are incentivized to favor modifications that reduce
interest rates rather than reduce principal, even if that raises the likelihood of
85
redefault.

The securitization process creates a complex string of relationships related to
each loan, yet the benefits of securitization are widely recognized.86 Securitization
has significantly contributed to capital availability, which in turn has increased
home purchases.87 By linking investors to lenders, securitization provides lenders
with large amounts of capital from investors around the world,88 enabling lenders
to quickly replenish their loan capital and offer new loans to new borrowers
without having to wait for the original borrower to repay the entire loan in order to
recover the capital extended through the original loan.89 As one commentator
observed, securitization has created a financial landscape in which “mortgages can
be pooled and then sliced into new securities to be sold to investors anywhere in
the world: a (piece of) a bank loan made in Boise can, in short, end up on the
balance sheet of a bank in Berlin.”90
The risk created by securitization is that originating lenders who immediately
sell the loans are less scrupulous in stringently underwriting the loans to reduce the
risk of default because the originating lender, who will have already sold the loan,
will not immediately feel the effects of default.91 This risk may have negative
impacts where the underlying loans are subprime loans or otherwise carry a high
risk of default.92 Indeed, industry surveys reveal that underwriting standards were
largely automated by 2001, thus reducing individualized attention to the unique
circumstances of a given borrower.93 As one scholar noted, “[i]n the world of
securitization, with its ever churning markets, there are few long term relationships,
but only the financial equivalents of one night stands.”94 Securitization has also
given rise to an increasing standardization of loan instruments, which has severely
limited any power the consumer formerly may have had to alter the loan contract.95
Furthermore, scholars have noted that the growth of securitization has dramatically

85. Id. at 69-70.
86. See Peterson, supra note 37, at 2188. See also Nelson, supra note 26, at 596; Tashman, supra
note 30, at 410.
87. See Nelson, supra note 26, at 596.
88. Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J.
257, 266 (2011).
89. See Tashman, supra note 30, at 410.
90. Brummer, supra note 88, 266.
91. See Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in
Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 550 (2002).
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 551.
95. Id.
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increased the use of mortgage brokers, which in turn has contributed to the rise in
subprime lending.96
Not surprisingly, subprime loan borrowers have been the casualties of a
significantly higher foreclosure rate than other borrowers.97 Since the foreclosure
crisis began with the decline in housing prices in 2007, approximately 2.5 million
homeowners nationwide have lost their homes to foreclosure, and a further 5.7
million are in immediate jeopardy of foreclosure.98 The Center for Responsible
Lending estimates that for loans originated between 2005 and 2008, subprime loans
account for sixty-four percent of the completed foreclosures, despite only
representing twenty-two percent of the total loans originated during this period.99
These numbers approximately correspond to a seventeen percent completed
foreclosure rate for subprime loans, which is nearly seven times greater than the
rate for other conventional home loans.100 Contrary to the perceptions of some, it is
estimated that eighty-two percent of completed foreclosures since 2007 were made
on owner-occupied properties.101 Meanwhile, as foreclosure numbers remain at
record highs and continue to climb,102 analysts estimate that between ten and
thirteen million homes will enter foreclosure before this crisis is over.103 To put the
current foreclosure numbers in perspective, the foreclosure rates associated with
this crisis have reached rates of three times the rate registered in 1933 at the height
of the Great Depression.104
In addition to the obvious impacts on homeowners, high foreclosure rates
result in significant losses for both lenders and investors, and also create third party
externalities.105 Typically, lenders lose an estimated forty to fifty percent of their
96. Id. at 553. Subprime loans are loans extended to borrowers that generally would not qualify for
credit due to lower than average income and credit scores. Tashman, supra note 30, at 408-09. Lenders
typically charge higher interest rates for subprime loans than for other loans as protection against the
corresponding higher risk of default. Id. at 409. The subprime lending market has also given rise to a
number of oppressive lending practices, including: the extension of credit on terms that cannot
realistically be repaid in consideration of the borrower’s income; requiring repeated refinancing of the
loan to extract additional fees from the borrower, even when not in the borrower’s best interest;
deceptive practices that conceal the true nature of the loan; and extending a loan that is more expensive
than the borrower’s income and credit score warrant. See Nathaniel R. Hull, Comment, Crossing the
Line: Prime, Subprime, and Predatory Lending, 61 ME. L. REV. 287, 301 (2009).
97. See DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, FORECLOSURES BY
RACE AND ETHNICITY: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF A CRISIS 7 (2010), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/foreclosures-by-race-andethnicity.pdf.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 7.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 22 and accompanying text..
103. Id. at 3.
104. Problems in Mortgage Servicing From Modification to Foreclosure: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 4 (2010) (statement of Diane Thompson,
National Consumer Law Center, noting that the foreclosure rate at the end of the second quarter of 2010
was 4.57%, as opposed to 1.4% for non-farm foreclosures in 1933).
105. Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy,
2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 568-69 (2009). These externalities include costs to communities caused by
foreclosure flight and depressed home values. Id. at 569.
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investment in a foreclosure sale,106 and even greater losses have been cited since
the foreclosure crisis began.107
Thus, Congress, local governments, and
homeowners are not the only parties with incentives to avoid foreclosure as lenders
and investors would appear to have strong financial incentives to avoid foreclosure
whenever there are other reasonable alternatives.108
C. The Federal Response to the Foreclosure Crisis
Federal relief for homeowners facing foreclosure has included government
promotion of mortgage modifications.109 For example, the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) offers government subsidies to lenders agreeing to
modify mortgage terms for qualifying lower-income homeowners facing
foreclosure.110 Designed to encourage loan modifications on a large scale, the
program originally allocated seventy-five billion dollars to be disbursed to
servicers, investors, and borrowers as an incentive to sweeten modification
solutions.111 HAMP requires that participating lenders review loan modification
options for qualifying homeowners in foreclosure or at risk of foreclosure.112
HAMP also requires that the servicer conduct a “net present value” calculation for
the loan in foreclosure to determine whether affordable modification as compared
to foreclosure best maximizes the mortgage holder’s financial interests in the
mortgage.113 Under the HAMP program, when the net present value calculation
106. Id. at 568.
107. See GEOFFRY WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE
MEDIATION
PROGRAMS:
CAN
THEY
SAVE
HOMES?
3
(2009),
available
at
http://www.realestateeconomywatch.com/wp-includes/upload-files/ReportS-Sept09.pdf.
108. See id.
109. Justin Wagner, Assisting Distressed Homeowners to Avoid Foreclosure: An Advocate’s Role in
an Evolving Judicial and Policy Environment, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 423, 433 (2010).
110. Id. at 435. HAMP was by no means the only program adopted by the Federal Government and
designed to assist homeowners in staying in their homes. Other initiatives included, but were not
limited to, the Home Affordable Refinance Program and other guidelines similar to those prescribed by
HAMP that attached to Government Sponsored Entities following the federal bailout of financial
institutions. WALSH, supra note 107, at 7. However, addressing the varied federal responses to the
foreclosure crisis is beyond the scope of this Comment, and for our purposes, a brief description of
HAMP suffices. For a detailed description of HAMP and further sources regarding related legislation,
see id.
111. WALSH, supra note 107, at 7.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 7-8. Walsh offers a helpful explanation of the net present value calculation:
The HAMP loan modification analysis uses a calculation made up of two distinct parts.
The first part of the analysis runs data through a sequence of loan modification options to
arrive at a new affordable monthly payment for the borrower. As applied in sequence,
these options include the capitalization of arrears, an interest rate reduction in steps to as
low as 2%, extension of the loan repayment term, and then forbearance of a portion of the
outstanding principal. Each option is applied in sequence until a monthly payment for
principal, interest, taxes and insurance is reached that takes up no more than 31% of the
household’s current gross monthly income. After the program has modified the loan
terms as needed to arrive at an affordable monthly payment, it produces a dollar figure
that tells the servicer the “net present value” to investors of the loan as modified. The net
present value of the modified loan is figured using a percentage discount. This discount
factors in the delay in receipt of the reduced scheduled payments under the modified
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favors modification and the parties otherwise meet the qualifying criteria, the
mortgagee is obliged to implement a modified payment schedule based on monthly
payments of no more than thirty-one percent of the mortgagor’s income.114
Despite HAMP’s promise, the possibility for success of “back end” solutions
to the foreclosure crisis was limited from the start,115 and consequently, HAMP has
resulted in only 230,000 permanent modifications through 2010, or about eight
percent of the total estimated number of homeowners eligible for the program.116
While the reasons for HAMP’s lack of success are complex, they include a series
of lurking obstacles for investors and servicers participating in the program,
including: a lack of servicer capacity to handle the scale of modifications requests;
financial disincentives related to the intricacies of securitization; investor desire not
to recognize losses; and concern about creating a moral hazard by granting
widespread modifications given the volume of underwater homeowners.117 To
address HAMP’s shortcomings in providing solutions for the overwhelming
majority of homeowners with outstanding distressed mortgages, the House
Financial Services Subcommittee has fielded proposals to make principal
reductions mandatory, rather than optional, and to empower bankruptcy courts to
modify mortgage balances for distressed homeowners.118 However, no such action
loan. It also takes into account the possibility of a cure by the borrower and the
likelihood and cost of a re-default. Once it has come up with a figure for the net present
value of the modified loan, the HAMP calculation then compares this value with the
estimated recovery the investors will obtain if a foreclosure is completed. In calculating
the value to be received from a completed foreclosure, the model takes into account the
current market value of the property and typical foreclosure losses, including the cost of
delays in re-sale . . . and foreclosure costs. After completing all entries on the net present
value calculation, the servicer has two figures to compare: the estimated loss investors
will incur from the loan modification and the estimated loss investors will incur from a
completed foreclosure. The servicer, acting on behalf of investors, must choose the
option producing the smaller loss. The calculation format allows for quick, streamlined
analysis of the data needed to make this decision. From the homeowner it requires the
input of limited information, primarily recent income figures. From the servicer it
requires some readily available servicer-specific and industry-wide data on costs and
losses associated with loan modifications and foreclosures. The calculation also factors
in data on the current market value for the property.
Id. at 8.
114. See id.
115. See Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the Lackluster
First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 727, 788 (2010) (“[B]ackend solutions to a financial crisis . . . are likely to be too slow and too weak to reach most of those who
suffer the consequences.”).
116. See id. at 763. Braucher describes HAMP as “disappointing” and notes official estimates
indicating that as many as forty percent of HAMP modifications could redefault. Id. at 727. But cf.
Wagner, supra note 109, at 436 (“A much larger share of homeowners, 787,231 or about 23% of
eligible homeowners, have received trial modification packages from their lenders,” although these
packages will not necessarily result in permanent modifications.).
117. Braucher, supra note 115, at 736.
118. See The Recently Announced Revisions to the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP):
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th
Cong. 130 (2010) (statement of Alan M. White, Associate Professor, Valparasio University School of
Law), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/Media/file/hearings/111/Printed Hearings/111122.pdf.
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has been taken,119 and in the wake of HAMP’s limited success, several state
governments have taken action to address high foreclosure rates.120
III. MAINE’S RESPONSE TO INCREASED FORECLOSURE FILINGS
A. An Overview of the Relevant Maine Law
To understand Maine’s response to the foreclosure spike, it is necessary to
generally understand Maine foreclosure law as it existed prior to the foreclosure
spike, as foreclosure is governed by state law and may vary widely from state to
state.121 The Law Court has described a mortgage of land to be
in form a deed of warranty with a condition subsequent defining the means by
which the grantor may defeat the conveyance. The legal title, therefore, passes
immediately upon the delivery of the mortgage; and the mortgagee is regarded as
122
having all the rights of a grantee in fee, subject to the defeasance.

This title theory conception of a mortgage “has been the accepted doctrine in this
State since it became a separate [state].”123 Thus, “a mortgage is a conditional
conveyance vesting the legal title in the mortgagee,” while only the equity right of
redemption remains with the mortgagor.124 Although Maine property law protects
the lender by requiring that title pass to the mortgagee upon execution of the loan,
the mortgagor must rely on equity and the procedural safeguards of the adversarial
system for protection of the right of redemption.
Maine has long required that all transactions conveying title must be recorded
according to state property laws to ensure enforcement as against third parties.125
Recording serves “to protect the title . . . against subsequent purchasers and
attaching creditors of the party thus parting with his title,” and thus acts to “protect
the honest and to defeat the plans of the fraudulent, concealing debtor.”126
However, proper recording is not required to enforce a written conveyance between
the parties to the transaction.127 In assessing an attempt to assign a mortgage
divorced from the debt it secures, the Law Court has held that “[t]he interest of a
mortgagee before entry is not real estate, but a personal chattel. The interest in
land is inseparable from the debt. It is an incident to the debt and cannot be
detached from it.”128
119. See id.
120. See WALSH, supra note 107, at 1.
121. Nelson, supra note 26, at 587.
122. Johnson v. McNeil, 2002 ME 99, ¶ 11, 800 A.2d 702 (quoting Gilman v. Wills, 66 Me. 273, 275
(1877)).
123. Id. ¶ 10 (quoting First Auburn Trust Co. v. Buck, 137 Me. 172, 176, 16 A.2d 258, 260 (1940)).
124. Id. (quoting Martel v. Bearce, 311 A.2d 540, 543 (Me. 1973)).
125. See Bailey v. Myrick, 50 Me. 171, 180 (1860).
126. Id.
127. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 33, § 201 (2011).
128. Wyman v. Porter, 108 Me. 110, 115, 79 A. 371, 373 (1911) (citing Ellison v. Daniels, 11 N.H.
274, 277 (1840)). The United States Supreme Court has held that “[t]he note and mortgage are
inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the
mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity.” Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 271, 274 (1872). The Law Court has not expressly adopted the Carpenter language, and, in
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In Maine, after a party breaches a condition of the mortgage, the foreclosure
process may proceed in one of two ways129: either by a power of sale foreclosure130
or by judicial process.131 Power of sale foreclosure is not available for noncommercial residential mortgages.132 Therefore, for purposes of this Comment,
foreclosure will refer exclusively to judicial foreclosure, which is the foreclosure
process subject to the mediation program.133 In a judicial foreclosure, “the
mortgagee or any person claiming under [the mortgagee] may proceed for the
purpose of foreclosure by a civil action against all parties in interest.”134 The Law
Court has long recognized that a promissory note secured by a mortgage is
enforceable by the note holder.135
B. An Act To Preserve Home Ownership and Stabilize the Economy by Preventing
Foreclosure
Faced with unprecedented foreclosure rates and limited federal success in
reversing these numbers, the Maine judicial and legislative branches endeavored to
design “an effective alternative dispute resolution process . . . [to] promote fair and
prompt resolutions . . . in foreclosure proceedings.”136 The result was “An Act to
Preserve Home Ownership and Stabilize the Economy by Preventing Unnecessary

Saunders, declined to address the situation in which the mortgage and note are held by different parties,
citing Wyman as an example of that factual scenario. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Saunders,
2010 ME 79, ¶ 11 n.3, 2 A.3d 289. Nevertheless, the Maine District Court has cited Wyman and
Carpenter together in support of the Carpenter proposition that the assignment of a mortgage alone is a
nullity. See BAC Home Loans Servicing LP v. Weymouth, No. RE-09-015, at 2 (Me. Dist. Ct.,
Kennebec, Dec. 2, 2009) (Mulhern, J.); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Hartman, No. RE-08-026, at 3 n.1
(Me. Dist. Ct., Augusta, May 11, 2009) (Mulhern, J.).
129. 2009 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 17, at 12.
130. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6203-A (2011).
131. See id. §§ 6321-25.
132. See id. § 6203-A.
133. Compare id. § 6203-A, with id. §§ 6321-25.
134. Id. § 6321.
135. See Webb v. Flanders, 32 Me. 175, 176 (1850); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys, Inc. v. Saunders,
2010 ME 79, ¶ 12, 2 A.3d 289. The state of the law is somewhat uncertain regarding the extent to
which the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) controls issues of enforcement of a mortgage note and
mortgage, and to what extent a mortgage note is a negotiable instrument within the meaning of the
UCC, currently codified in Maine at title 11, section 3-1104 of the Maine Revised Statutes. See FDIC v.
Houde, 90 F.3d 600, 604 n.3 (1st Cir. 1996) (proceeding on the assertion by both parties that the
mortgage note in question was a negotiable note within the meaning of the UCC, while recognizing that
an argument existed that the note was not a negotiable instrument within the meaning of the UCC). See
also generally JOHN A. SEBERT, DRAFT REPORT OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, UCC RULES APPLICABLE TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE NOTES
AND TO THE OWNERSHIP AND ENFORCEMENT OF THOSE NOTES AND THE MORTGAGES SECURING THEM
(2011) (suggesting that a mortgage note may be either negotiable or non-negotiable within the meaning
of the UCC); Letter from Adam J. Levitin et al. to the Permanent Editorial Bd. of the UCC (May 27,
2011),
available
at
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/levitin/documents/LawProfessors
UCCPEBLetter.pdf (arguing that the UCC largely does not apply to the enforcement of mortgage notes,
where enforcement is primarily realized through mortgage foreclosure which in significant part is
beyond the purview of the UCC).
136. 2009 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 17, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Foreclosures” (“the Act”).137 The Act was passed in June 2009 as emergency
legislation to be effective immediately, justified as such by the “unprecedented
levels” of foreclosures expected to continue at high levels, the “decline in the
State’s housing market,” loss in property values, the resulting decline in tax
revenues, and the burden this foreclosure load was placing on the courts.138 The
Act provided for the creation of a foreclosure mediation program to be
administered by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court and initiated statewide on
January 1, 2010.139 Subsequently, the Supreme Judicial Court adopted Maine Rule
of Civil Procedure 93 to govern the Court’s Foreclosure Diversion Program
(“FDP”), as authorized by the Act.140 The Court also amended Rule 56 to require
completion of mediation (absent waiver, good cause, or default of mediation)
before a foreclosing party can move for summary judgment.141 The FDP applies to
all foreclosures filed on or after January 1, 2010 against owner-occupied primary
residents of residential property consisting of four units or less.
The Act creates heightened notice and production requirements at the initiation
of the foreclosure action.142 These include the requirement that upon filing the
complaint, the mortgagee must “certify proof of ownership” of the mortgage note
and “produce evidence” of the mortgage and mortgage note, including all
assignments and endorsements of both documents.143 Upon initiation of the
foreclosure action, the mortgagee must also provide the homeowner with
information as to the homeowner’s right to cure the default by full payment of all
amounts due without acceleration; an itemized list of all amounts due and
additional charges; and the contact information for the persons having authority to
modify the loan.144 The foreclosure complaint sent to the homeowner must also
include both a brief description of the mediation program and a one-page form
answer informing the homeowner that failure to answer the complaint will result in
foreclosure.145 The defendant to the foreclosure action may complete the answer
form as the only necessary answer to preserve all defenses to the complaint.146
The Act also creates the mediation program, which is triggered by the
homeowner’s response to the foreclosure complaint, thus making mediation

137. P.L. 2009, ch. 402 (emergency, effective June 15, 2009). This Comment focuses on those
portions of the Act which are codified within title 14, chapter 713 of the Maine Revised Statutes.
138. Id. pmbl.
139. See id. § 24.
140. See ME. R. CIV. P. 93 (effective Jan. 1, 2010).
141. See ME. R. CIV. P. 56(j).
142. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 6111(1-A), 6321 (2011).
143. Id. § 6321.
144. Id. § 6111(1-A). The Act also required that the mortgagee notify the Maine Bureau of
Consumer Credit Protection (“BCCP”) of the defendant to the foreclosure action within three days of
providing notice to the homeowner. Id. § 6111(3-A). The BCCP is then required to contact the
homeowner and provide additional information regarding the homeowner’s rights and available
resources, including information pertaining to the mediation program, and availability of a foreclosure
prevention hotline. Id. § 6111(4-A). See also New Foreclosure Law - Frequently-Asked Questions, ME.
BUREAU
OF
CONSUMER
CREDIT
PROT.,
http://www.maine.gov/pfr/consumercredit/preforeclosure_faq.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
145. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6321-A(2).
146. See id.
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mandatory for both parties.147 Mediation requires that the defendant provide
financial information to the mortgagee prior to the mediation session to facilitate
modification or some other foreclosure-avoidance solution to the default, and the
parties may be required by the mediator to exchange further information in
anticipation of the mediation.148 Generally, mediation must be completed no more
than ninety days after the scheduling order is sent to the parties.149 Mediation
“shall address all issues of foreclosure,” including, ownership of the mortgage and
note, calculation of sums due, modification of the loan, and restructuring of the
mortgage debt.150 This process includes completion of a net present value
worksheet, which is developed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) and included in the FDIC’s Loan Modification Program Guide.151
Finally, mediation may not operate as a waiver of either party’s rights in the
foreclosure action.152
Additionally, Rule 93 specifically requires that the mortgagee’s representative
at mediation “ha[ve] the authority to agree to a proposed settlement, loan
modification, or dismissal of the action,” and only allows the mortgagee to appear
by telephone if the mortgagee’s counsel is authorized to agree to any proposed
agreement.153 If either party “fails to attend or to make a good faith effort to
mediate,” the court is authorized to impose “appropriate sanctions.”154 Such
sanctions may include, but are not limited to
the assessment of costs and fees, assessment of reasonable attorney fees, entry of
judgment, permitting dispositive motions and/or requests for admissions to be
filed, entry of an order that mediation shall not occur, dismissal without prejudice,
dismissal without prejudice with a prohibition on refiling the foreclosure action for
155
a stated period of time, and/or dismissal with prejudice.

Upon completion of each mediation session, the mediator must submit a report to
the court indicating any agreement or points of agreement reached and the results
of the FDIC worksheet analysis.156 Finally, the mediation program requires some
confidentiality of certain information revealed during mediation.157
The Act raises the burden of proof on the foreclosing party before foreclosure
judgment may be granted by requiring that the mortgagee prove that all elements of

147. Id. § 6321-A(6).
148. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(c)(4), (p)(1).
149. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(e).
150. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(g).
151. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(n). The FDIC net present value worksheet served as a prototype, with some
modifications, for the HAMP net present value worksheet. Walsh, supra note 107, at 8.
152. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6321-A(5); ME. R. CIV. P. 93(o).
153. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(h).
154. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(j).
155. Id.
156. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(n).
157. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(p). There is some ambiguity as to the application of the confidentiality
provisions in the Rule, particularly as to the extent to which a mediator’s report is confidential, which is
not entirely clear based on the language of Rule 93. However, clarity as to this issue will be crucial
going forward to ensure consistent enforcement of negotiated agreements memorialized in a mediator’s
report.
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the heightened notice rules were “strictly performed.”158 Furthermore, the Act
requires that the mortgagee provide the street address, if any, of the property
subject to the foreclosure action and the book and page number in the registry of
deeds identifying the property in question.159
C. Relevant Decisions by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Since the passage of Maine’s new foreclosure law in 2009 the Law Court has
decided several residential foreclosure cases that are worthy of mention for
purposes of this Comment.160
The first of these cases, decided in December 2009, is Deutsche Bank National
Trust Co. v. Raggiani.161 In that case, Joanna and Vincenzo Raggiani executed a
promissory note secured by a mortgage in favor of Argent Mortgage in July
2006.162 Just over a year later, the Raggianis defaulted on the note when they failed
to make a monthly payment.163 Deutsche Bank then filed a complaint for
foreclosure and moved for summary judgment, asserting in its statement of material
facts that it was the holder of the mortgage and promissory note.164 However, this
assertion was not supported by a record citation, rather only with a citation to
Deutsche Bank’s “unverified complaint,” while the Raggianis’ contested Deutsche
Bank’s ownership of both the mortgage and note.165 At a hearing before the
District Court (Portland, Eggert, J.), Deutsche Bank was allowed to admit into
evidence, over the Raggianis’ objection, a copy of Argent Mortgage’s assignment
of the note and mortgage to Deutsche Bank.166 Although the note was not properly
filed in the summary judgment record, the court considered it and granted summary
judgment for Deutsche Bank.167
The Raggianis appealed, and the Law Court vacated the judgment.168 The Law
Court held that because Deutsche Bank failed to support its factual assertion at
summary judgment with a proper record citation as required by M.R. Civ. P. 56(h),
the Bank did not prove it was the owner of the note and mortgage; therefore, it was
not entitled to summary judgment.169 The Law Court noted that a “court is neither
required nor permitted to independently search a record to find support for facts
offered by a party.”170 The Law Court reasoned that “[i]n the unique setting of

158. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §6321 (2011).
159. Id.
160. The issues presented in these cases do not directly address the mediation program. However, in
the context of the FDP, these cases are instructive in understanding the current state of the law regarding
foreclosure proceedings in Maine.
161. 2009 ME 120, 985 A.2d 1.
162. Id. ¶ 2.
163. Id.
164. Id. ¶ 3.
165. Id.
166. Id. ¶ 4.
167. Id.
168. Id. ¶ 1.
169. Id. ¶ 6.
170. Id. ¶ 7 (quoting Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, ¶ 9, 770 A.2d 653).
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summary judgment, strict adherence to the Rule’s requirements is necessary to
ensure that the process is both predictable and just.”171
The same month the Law Court ruled on Raggiani, it also decided Chase
Home Finance v. Higgins.172 John and Valarie Higgins executed a promissory note
for $ 250,000 secured by a home mortgage to Wachovia Mortgage Corporation.173
The terms of the loan required repayment over thirty years with a fixed annual
interest rate of six percent.174 Chase filed a foreclosure action in 2007, alleging that
the Higginses defaulted on the modified mortgage agreement, were properly
notified of their right to cure, and owed Chase $ 286,965.33.175 Chase moved for
summary judgment, which the Higginses opposed, providing evidence that Chase
had accelerated the loan before the statutorily required notice of default was
provided, in violation of title 14, section 6111 of the Maine Revised Statutes.176
The Higginses also contested the amount owed, providing evidence that suggested
they had not been fully credited for at least nine payments on the note.177 Chase
filed a reply memorandum and supporting documents that controverted the
Higginses’ assertions but did not properly file a reply statement of material fact,
and thus the memorandum was not considered part of the summary judgment
record.178 Nevertheless, the Superior Court (York County, Fritzsche, J.) granted
summary judgment in favor of Chase.179
The Higginses appealed, and the Law Court vacated and remanded, finding
that genuine issues of material fact persisted as to whether Chase provided the
Higginses with proper notice and as to the amount due on the note.180 The Law
Court noted that summary judgment must not be granted in a residential foreclosure
action before the mortgage holder provides certain information, including
the existence of the mortgage . . . ; properly presented proof of ownership of the
mortgage note and the mortgage, including all assignments . . . ; a breach of
condition in the mortgage; the amount due on the mortgage, including reasonable
attorney’s fees . . . ; the order of priority and any amounts that may be due to other
parties . . . ; evidence of properly served notice of default and mortgagor’s right to
cure . . . ; . . . proof of completed mediation (or waiver or default of mediation),
when required . . . ; and, if the homeowner has not appeared in the proceeding, a
statement . . . of whether or not the [homeowner] is in military service in
accordance with the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.181

Third, in September 2010, the Law Court decided Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. v. Saunders.182 Jon Saunders signed a promissory note
171. Id.
172. 2009 ME 136, 985 A.2d 508.
173. Id. ¶ 2.
174. Id.
175. Id. ¶ 4.
176. Id. ¶ 7.
177. Id.
178. Id. ¶ 8.
179. Id. ¶ 1.
180. Id.
181. Id. ¶ 11 (citations omitted). To establish the list of required information, the Law Court relied
on many of the sources that have been discussed in this Part. See id.
182. 2010 ME 79, 2 A.3d 289.
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in benefit of Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. in June 2006.183 The accompanying
mortgage instrument signed by Jon and Belinda Saunders secured the promissory
note and named MERS as “nominee” for Accredited and all “successors and
assigns.”184 Less than three years after taking the mortgage registered to MERS,
the Saunderses failed to make payments on the note, and MERS filed a foreclosure
complaint on February 4, 2009.185 MERS moved for summary judgment on May
27, 2009, claiming it was the “holder” of both the mortgage and the note without
identifying whether any real property actually secured the note.186 The Saunderses
maintained that MERS held neither the mortgage nor the note and produced
MERS’s admissions, pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 36, that Deutsche
Bank was the actual note holder.187 The parties further disputed whether Deutsche
Bank gave the Saunderses effective notice of the foreclosure proceedings and
whether the Saunderses were actually in default on the note.188
On September 9, 2009, the District Court denied MERS’s motion for summary
judgment without detailing what genuine issues of material fact persisted.189 The
next day, Deutsche Bank moved, pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c),
to substitute itself for MERS where the Bank was not yet a party to the action.190
Approximately one week later and before the District Court had ruled on the
substitution motion, Deutsche Bank moved to reconsider or amend the order
denying summary judgment for MERS pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) and made a motion for further findings pursuant Rule 52(b).191 In support of
these motions, Deutsche Bank filed a document showing that on July 8, 2009,
Accredited transferred the promissory note to Deutsche Bank and that MERS had
transferred to Deutsche Bank any interest it had in the note and mortgage.192 The
Saunderses contested both motions and filed their own cross-motion for summary
judgment, claiming that neither party could show that MERS held the note when
the complaint was originally filed.193 The District Court entered judgment for
Deutsche Bank on December 16, 2009, allowing Deutsche Bank’s substitution for
MERS, and simultaneously granting summary judgment to Deutsche Bank.194

183. Id. ¶ 3. Accredited Home Lenders is listed in Maine as a California corporation. Corporate
Name Search, ME. DEP’T OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, https://icrs.informe.org/nei-sosicrs/ICRS?CorpSumm=19980038+F (last visited Sept. 23, 2011). Accredited’s corporate authority in
Maine was revoked on September 28, 2009 after it failed to file its annual report. Id. (click on “View
list of filings”). Accredited filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on May 1, 2009 and former clients may call
a phone number to get more information regarding their Accredited issued loans. See Accredited Home
Lenders Holding Co., KURTZMAN CARSON CONSULTANTS, http://www.kccllc.net/accredited (last visited
Sept. 24, 2011).
184. Saunders, 2010 ME 79, ¶ 3, 2 A.3d 289.
185. Id. ¶ 4.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. ¶ 5.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. ¶ 6.
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The Saunderses appealed, arguing that (1) as a non-stakeholder, MERS did not
have standing to sue, (2) substitution of parties could not be used to cure the
jurisdictional defect, and (3) Deutsche Bank was not entitled to summary
judgment.195
Examining the question of MERS’s standing, the Law Court found that the
relationship of MERS to the Saunderses’ transaction was somewhat unclear.196
The Court noted that the mortgage document simultaneously defined MERS as
both a “nominee” and a “mortgagee.”197 The Law Court found that
[Deutsche] Bank admitted in its statement of material facts that Accredited had
never assigned, transferred, or endorsed the note executed by Jon Saunders to
MERS, and represented that Accredited had transferred the note directly to
[Deutsche] Bank. Without possession of or any interest in the note, MERS lacked
standing to institute foreclosure proceedings and could not invoke the jurisdiction
198
of our trial courts.

Furthermore, the Law Court held that Accredited was the real party in interest at
the time MERS initiated the action199 because Accredited was both the mortgagee
and the holder of the note, whereas MERS merely held the right to record the
mortgage.200
However, the Law Court found that substitution was not an abuse of the
District Court’s discretion where the Law Court had not previously spoken on the
issue of MERS standing in foreclosure, and the complaint filed in MERS’s name
rather than the lender’s name was an “understandable mistake” within the meaning
of the Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) substitution provision and the Court’s
holding in Tisdale v. Rawson.201 Finally, the Court held that the District Court
erred in granting summary judgment because “the Rules of Civil Procedure do not
allow for reconsideration or amendment in the absence of a final judgment,” and
because the foreclosing parties’ amended motion did not support a judgment as a
matter of law for Deutsche Bank.202 Thus, the Law Court remanded the case for
further proceedings.203
Fourth, in January 2011, the Law Court decided JPMorgan Chase Bank v.
Harp.204 JPMorgan Chase filed a foreclosure complaint against Brian Harp in
March 2009 alleging that Harp was in default.205 However, the record established
that JPMorgan Chase was not assigned the mortgage until April 16, 2009 and that
the assignment was not recorded until May 28, 2009.206 Nevertheless, the District

195. Id. ¶ 1.
196. Id. ¶ 8.
197. See id. ¶ 9.
198. Id. ¶ 15.
199. Id. ¶ 19.
200. Id. ¶ 11 n.3.
201. Id. ¶ 19 (citing Tisdale v. Rawson, 2003 ME 68, ¶ 19, 822 A.2d 1136).
202. Id. ¶ 26.
203. Id.
204. 2011 ME 5, 10 A.3d 718.
205. Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
206. Id. ¶ 3. Indeed, JPMorgan never affirmatively brought the fact of its subsequent acquisition of
the mortgage to the court’s attention. Id. ¶ 10 n.4.
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Court (Ellsworth, Staples, J.) granted JPMorgan Chase’s motion for summary
judgment.207
Harp appealed, arguing that because the bank did not hold the mortgage at the
time the action was commenced, it lacked standing to bring the action.208 The Law
Court affirmed summary judgment for JPMorgan Chase,209 reasoning that although
JPMorgan Chase “improperly filed the foreclosure complaint” before owning the
mortgage, “this defect was cured” when the mortgage was assigned to JPMorgan
Chase.210 Thus, because Harp did not raise this issue until after the assignment and
JPMorgan Chase properly held the mortgage before moving for summary
judgment, the court below did not err in granting JPMorgan Chase’s motion. 211
The Court concluded that JPMorgan Chase’s premature filing was an
“understandable mistake” within the meaning of Maine Rule of Civil Procedure
17(a), and that although substitution might be available in this case, it was not
“appropriate or necessary.”212 The Law Court was careful to note that this case
appeared before it in a “new and uncharted posture” and, therefore, cautioned
against relying on substitution to avoid strict standing requirements.213 The Court
also observed that although the District Court granted summary judgment before
the enactment of the FDP, going forward the mediation program would protect
homeowners and require “careful scrutiny for compliance with all procedural
prerequisites at the outset of litigation.”214
Harp further argued that JPMorgan did not provide him with proper notice of
default and that the servicer had instructed him not to make payments while a loan
modification was being negotiated.215 The Law Court, however, dismissed the
notice argument, finding that Harp had failed to sufficiently meet his burden to
prove the applicability of this affirmative defense.216 As to the arguments
regarding the modification, the Court found no record evidence to support Harp’s
contentions.217 Significantly, Harp appeared before the Court as a pro se litigant,218
and in its conclusion the Law Court noted the fact that JPMorgan’s motion for
summary judgment was “effectively unopposed” as support for its flexible
application of the standing requirements.219
These cases demonstrate the Law Court’s careful scrutiny of summary
judgment motions by foreclosing parties, particularly when effectively opposed by
counsel, as evidenced by the fact that in three out of the four cases the Law Court
vacated lower court judgments in favor of the foreclosing party based on persisting
issues of fact. Furthermore, the Court’s decision in Saunders effectively precludes
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. ¶ 1.
See id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶¶ 11-12.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 12 n.5.
Id. ¶¶ 16-17.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 14 n.6.
Id. ¶ 19.
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MERS from acting as the plaintiff to initiate foreclosure actions insofar as MERS
acts as merely a nominee to the mortgagee. Finally, in both Saunders and Harp,
the Law Court demonstrates a somewhat flexible approach to substitution, although
the Court in Harp appears to condition this flexibility on the facts of the case and
discourages future parties from relying on substitution to avoid the strict standing
requirements in foreclosure cases.
IV. MAXIMIZING FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY? MEDIATION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
AND THE “GOOD FAITH” REQUIREMENT
A. The Results of the Mediation Program
Prior to implementing the FDP, the Maine Judicial Commission on
Foreclosure Diversion identified the goal of promoting “prompt and fair
resolutions” to foreclosure proceedings.220 In a report to the Maine Legislature
submitted after one year of operation of the FDP, the Judicial Branch noted that
2010 saw 5,409 new foreclosure filings,221 of which the courts conducted
mediation in 983 cases and a total of 1,243 mediations when including cases
involving multiple mediation sessions.222 The courts conducted these mediation
sessions between April and December 2010,223 resulting in 505 final reports filed
upon completion of the mediation.224 From those 505 final reports, one can begin
to ascertain the initial results of the mediation program. Mediation was concluded
most often—over fifty percent of the time—because the parties could not reach an
agreement.225 About twenty-one percent of the final reports indicated that the
parties reached some sort of agreement.226 Slightly more than twenty percent, or
the remaining cases, concluded because the homeowner failed to attend the
mediation sessions.227 Thus, the report reveals that the mediation program has
obtained a twenty-one percent success rate in its first year of operation.228 Of the
1243 mediations, the remaining 738 that did not produce final reports resulted in
interim reports.229 The two most common reasons for issuing an interim rather than
a final report were either “because the parties wanted to exchange additional
information or because the parties entered into a loan modification with a
[successfully run] trial period . . . before the [mortgagee] would agree to dismiss
the [foreclosure] action.”230

220. 2009 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 17, at 9. These goals conform to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 1 (“[The Rules] shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action.”).
221. 2011 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 21, at 2.
222. Id. at 4.
223. Telephone Interview with Lauren Blake Weliver, Manager, Foreclosure Diversion Program
(Aug. 16, 2011) (notes on file with author).
224. 2011 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 21, at 4.
225. Id. (207 out of 505 mediations where a final report was submitted).
226. Id. (107 out of 505 mediations where a final report was submitted).
227. Id. (121 out of 505 mediations where a final report was submitted).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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However, the report reveals that even where agreements are reached, these
agreements often take “months of negotiation by the parties” and thus the true
impact of the mediation program will not be evident until more cases move through
the mediation process and finally off the court’s docket.231 Of the ninety-eight
cases that resulted in dismissal because of mediation in 2010, sixty-two involved
modification agreements.232 The remaining dismissals were a result of one of the
following: repayment and forbearance plans; deeds in lieu of foreclosure; short
sales; mortgage reinstatements; homeowner sales; or, cash for keys agreements.233
It is worth noting that four dismissals were the result of the court’s sanction against
the lender.234 Unfortunately, the FDP does not have the ability to track successful
mediations upon dismissal of the case, and thus it will be difficult to gauge the
extent to which mediated modifications provide lasting solutions for the parties
involved.235
In sum, in its first year of operation, the mediation program achieved
significant success in assisting homeowners and lenders to avoid foreclosure
through negotiated resolutions to default. However, it is also apparent that the
majority of mediation sessions do not result in a negotiated resolution while delays
during mediation and a lack of permanency of negotiated agreements have proven
to be significant challenges to the program’s stated goals of maximizing fairness
and efficiency. Any adjustments to the program going forward must take these
factors into account while improving upon the overall successes of the program in
its first year.
B. The Ongoing Challenges to Effective Foreclosure Diversion: Summary
Judgment Shortcomings and Pro Se Defendants
In addition to certain difficulties in achieving efficient and permanent
resolutions at the mediation phase of the foreclosure dispute, it is worth considering
two additional factors that have contributed to hindering the mediation program’s
success. The first is revealed at the summary judgment stage of litigation. Indeed,
as in Raggiani, Higgins, and Saunders, a series of recent Maine lower court cases
reveal regular delays and challenges to fairness when the foreclosing party moves
for summary judgment yet fails to meet its burden of proof to warrant foregoing

231. Id. at 5.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. Although tracking the success of a negotiated agreement following dismissal from
mediation is clearly beyond the immediate jurisdiction of the District Courts, the ultimate success of the
mediation program depends upon whether the agreements negotiated in mediation prove to be long-term
solutions rather than merely temporary foreclosure avoidance mechanisms. Thus, while it is
understandable that long-term tracking of negotiated solutions has proven beyond the scope of the
FDP’s data collection capabilities, any evaluation of the ultimate success of the program depends on
some analysis of the lasting effects of mediation. Therefore, the FDP and the Legislature should
consider creating some means for obtaining this data, even if only from a representative sample of
mediation participants.
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further proceedings.236 An examination of these cases reveals that the defendants’
attorneys repeatedly raised genuine issues of material fact, leading the lower courts
to subsequently deny the foreclosing party’s motion for summary judgment.237
Presiding judges in these cases found genuine issues of material fact as to whether
(1) the moving party was actually the owner of the note,238 (2) the defendant was
actually in default,239 (3) the foreclosing party provided the homeowner with proper
notice of default,240 (4) the defendant in default had a meaningful opportunity to
236. See infra notes 243-46 and accompanying text. Although most of these cases were filed prior to
the initiation of the mediation program, the results at summary judgment nonetheless prove instructive
going forward.
237. See infra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
238. See CIT Grp./Consumer Fin. v. Bernier, 2008 Me. Super. LEXIS 166 (July 29, 2008); SunTrust
Mortg., Inc. v. Humes, No. RE-08-196 (Me. Dist. Ct., West Bath, Jan. 6, 2010) (Field, J.); HSBC Bank
USA, Nat’l Ass’n v. Davis, No. RE-09-098 (Me. Dist. Ct., West Bath, Mar. 19, 2010) (Field, J.); BAC
Home Loans Servicing LP v. Weymouth, No. RE-09-015 (Me. Dist. Ct., Augusta, Dec. 12, 2009)
(Mulhern, J.); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Jaenisch, No. RE-09-23 (Me. Dist. Ct., Dover-Foxcroft, July 31,
2009) (Stitham, J.) (denying summary judgment for the foreclosing party where it failed to establish
valid assignment of the note to the Bank, valid possession of the note, and the appropriate amount of
interest due on the note); Wells Fargo Bank v. Clark, No. RE-08-295 (Me. Dist. Ct., Biddeford, June 9,
2009) (Douglas, J.) (holding that the foreclosing party was not a party in interest and lacked standing
where it was assigned the mortgage and note four days after it filed the foreclosure action); U.S. Bank
Nat’l Ass’n v. Hartman, No. RE-08-026 (Me. Dist. Ct., Augusta, May 11, 2009) (Mulhern, J.) (denying
summary judgment to the foreclosing party where it failed to provide the defendant with an indorsed
copy of the promissory note as requested by defendant in discovery, thus raising a genuine issue of
material fact as to the validity of the endorsement); Aurora Loan Servs. LLC v. Simpson, No. RE-08127 (Me. Dist. Ct., Wiscasset, Apr. 16, 2009) (Hjelm, J.); LaSalle Bank v. Frye, No. RE-08-41 (Me.
Dist. Ct., South Paris, Jan. 14, 2009) (Cote, J.) (finding that the Bank had not satisfactorily established it
was the holder of the promissory note as of the date of filing, thus precluding summary judgment);
CountryWide Home Loans, Inc. v. D’Amico, No. RE-07-204 (Me. Dist. Ct., Biddeford, Dec. 3, 2008)
(O’Neil, J.); PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Mosher, No. RE-08-10 (Me. Dist. Ct., Farmington, May 6, 2008)
(Stanfill, J.) (finding there was an issue of material fact as to whether PHH had any interest in the note it
sought to enforce where it was assigned the mortgage but the record did not support a finding that it held
the note); Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Philbrick, No. RE-07-70 (Me. Dist. Ct., Farmington,
Jan. 28, 2008) (Stanfill, J.) (finding that while the record supported a finding that the mortgage was
assigned to Deutsche Bank, there was no evidence on the record that the promissory note was ever
assigned to the Bank).
239. See Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown, No. RE-2008-258 (Me. Super. Ct., Cum. Cty., Feb. 12,
2009) (Warren, J.); Simpson, No. RE-08-127; D’Amico, No. RE-07-204. In Brown, the court found that
Quicken’s attached affidavit in support of its motion for summary judgment, which alleged defendant
Brown was in default, was not based on personal knowledge and not supported by any attached business
record; thus, the affidavit was inadmissible hearsay under Maine Rule of Evidence 803(6), and summary
judgment was precluded under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). Brown, RE-08-258, at 3.
240. See Camden Nat’l Bank v. Soule, 2010 Me. Super. LEXIS 39 (Apr. 8, 2010); Davis, No. RE-09098; Humes, No. RE-08-196 (holding that the foreclosing party provided defective notice of default
where it did not adhere to the mortgage agreement’s requirements for foreclosure). In Soule, the
Superior Court (Cumberland County, Wheeler, J.) rejected a mortgagee’s motion for summary judgment
on its foreclosure action finding that the moving party had failed to include information in its statement
of material facts that the “notice requirement [was] strictly complied with or a statement as to whether
or not the Defendants are in military service as required by the Servicemember’s Civil Relief Act.”
Soule, 2010 Me. Super. LEXIS 39, at *4. The Servicemember’s Civil Relief Act provides heightened
protection from default judgment for military service members, including requiring the moving party to
file an affidavit as to whether the defendant who has failed to appear is a military service member before
granting summary judgment for the plaintiff. See 50 U.S.C.A. Appx. § 521 (West 2010). The Court
found a deficiency in the notice requirement existed at summary judgment despite the fact that the
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cure default;241 and (5) the foreclosing party properly established the amount due
on the promissory note.242
Of the fifteen lower court orders denying summary judgment examined in this
Comment, twelve denied summary judgment based on the moving party’s failure to
satisfactorily prove it was the owner of the note at the time it filed the foreclosure
complaint.243 Generally, the lower court’s reasoning in denying summary
judgment in these cases rested on four different factual scenarios: (1) a failure to
properly record an assignment;244 (2) the foreclosing party had proven it received
foreclosing party attached an affidavit to the statement of material facts evidencing notice. Soule, 2010
Me. Super. LEXIS 39, at *4-5 n.4. However, where the foreclosing party had failed to cite the
information from this affidavit in its statement of material fact, the Court found that this affidavit was
“not properly before the court,” and cited Chase Home Finance v. Higgins as supporting precedent. Id.
In Higgins, the Law Court found that summary judgment was precluded even though “[a]n affidavit
referred to in [the Plaintiff’s] statement of material facts did state the amount owed on the mortgage note
[but] the amount was not stated in the statement of material facts itself.” Chase Home Fin. LLC v.
Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶ 12 n.4, 985 A.2d 508.
241. See Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Taggert, 2009 Me. Super. LEXIS 105 (July 20, 2009). The
Superior Court (Cumberland County, Cole, J.) denied summary judgment where an issue of material
fact remained as to whether the lender had provided the homeowner with a “meaningful opportunity” to
cure the default as required by the mortgage agreement. Id. at *9. The homeowner, Connie Taggert,
had executed a promissory note and mortgage in 2005 to MERS as nominee for the lender. Id. at *1.
MERS subsequently assigned the note to the Bank of New York, whose servicer sent Taggert a default
notice in October 2008, advising Taggert that $ 11,888.92 was due on the mortgage and that further fees
could accrue immediately. Id. at *2-3. That same month, Taggert and another defendant party in
interest (collectively “Taggert”) interacted with the Bank in attempting to cure the default. Id. at *3.
Taggert had a check sent to the Bank in the full amount due according to the notice, but the Bank
returned the check a few days later claiming it failed to cure the default because the payment was not
equal to the full amount due at the time of receipt of the check. Id. While the letter did not reveal the
full amount due to cure the default, it advised Taggert to contact the attorney assigned to her loan. Id. at
*4. However, the Superior Court record reveals that prior to sending the check to the Bank, Taggert had
attempted to contact the Bank’s servicer or the servicer’s attorney five different times in less than a
month to ascertain the full amount needed to cure the default. Id. at *4 n.2. Taggert claimed that,
despite these attempts, she was never provided information as to what she actually owed and alleged the
servicer or servicer’s attorney told her on different occasions that this information was “not available”;
that her file did not appear on the attorney’s computer; and even that the firm was “way behind” in
calculating the full amount due and therefore was unable to help her. Id. at *7 n.4. The court reasoned
that while Taggert was incorrect in arguing that she was not in default based on the attempted payment
that the servicer returned where that payment didn’t represent the full amount due, Taggert had
generated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she had been afforded an adequate opportunity
to cure the default as provided by the mortgage agreement, and therefore, the Bank was precluded from
summary judgment. Id. at *9.
242. Jaenisch, No. RE-09-23, at 3.
243. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., CIT Grp./Consumer Fin. v. Bernier, 2008 Me. Super. LEXIS 166, at *3 (July 29,
2008). The Superior Court (Cumberland County, Cole, J.) denied summary judgment for CIT Group,
the alleged mortgagee and foreclosing party, where CIT failed to provide any documentation proving it
was in fact the owner of the loan despite the fact that the homeowner “failed to properly oppose” the
summary judgment motion. Id. at *3-4. The defendants, Joseph and Ivy Bernier, had executed a
promissory note secured by a mortgage to MERS in 2007. Id. at *1. The Berniers simultaneously
executed a quit claim deed to Amanda Bernier, yet less than three months later, the Berniers were in
default on the loan. Id. Six months after default, CIT allegedly sent a notice to cure default to the
Berniers and subsequently moved for foreclosure. Id. at *1-2. In denying summary judgment, the
Superior Court noted that CIT had conceded that at the time it filed for summary judgment, it had not
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an assignment of the mortgage, but not the note;245 (3) the foreclosure action was
initiated by a party who was only assigned the note after the action commenced;246

yet recorded an assignment of the note, and the court rejected CIT’s attempt to cure this defect by filing
an assignment of the mortgage after moving for summary judgment. Id. at *3. The court cited the Law
Court’s holding in Camden National Bank v. Peterson for the proposition that the court, in making a
summary judgment determination, is “neither required nor permitted” to search the record outside the
summary judgment filings for facts supporting the parties’ motions. Id. at *4 (citing Camden Nat’l
Bank v. Peterson, 2008 ME 85, ¶ 26, 948 A.2d 1251). See also ME. R. CIV. P. 56(h)(4) (“The court
shall have no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced in
the parties’ separate statement of facts.”). Interestingly, Justice Cole, presiding in Bernier, had faced a
somewhat similar issue in Taggert, where the moving party, Bank of New York, filed a foreclosure
complaint one week before receiving an assignment of the mortgage from MERS, yet the court declined
to consider the defendant’s argument that the Bank lacked standing at the time the complaint was filed.
Taggert, 2009 Me. Super. LEXIS 105, at *2 n.1. Rather, the court stated that it was “satisfied that
[Bank of New York] will receive a corrective assignment” and thus rejected the standing argument. Id.
245. See, e.g., BAC Home Loans Servicing LP v. Weymouth, No. RE-09-015, at 2 (Me. Dist. Ct.,
Augusta, Dec. 12, 2009) (Mulhern, J.). See also Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Philbrick, No.
RE-07-70 (Me. Dist. Ct., Farmington, Jan. 28, 2008) (Stanfill, J.). In Weymouth, the District Court
(Augusta, Mulhern, J.) denied summary judgment to BAC where BAC failed to prove it was the valid
assignee of the underlying promissory note. Weymouth, No. RE-09-015, at 1. Defendant Celisa
Weymouth executed a promissory note to American Residential Mortgage (“ARM”) and signed the
underlying mortgage over to MERS as ARM’s nominee. Id. MERS subsequently assigned the
mortgage to CountryWide Home Loans Servicing, which then assigned the note to BAC. Id. at 1-2.
When Weymouth defaulted on her mortgage and BAC brought the foreclosure action seeking summary
judgment, the court noted “an assignment of the mortgage by MERS is not an assignment of the note.”
Id. at 2. Thus, the court found BAC had not made any showing that MERS ever had any interest in the
note to suggest the assignment of the mortgage to BAC included assignment of the note, and therefore,
BAC was precluded from summary judgment. Id. (citing Wyman v. Porter, 108 Me. 110, 115, 79 A.
371, 373 (1911), and Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 271, 274 (1872), in support of the view
that an assignment of a mortgage alone without the promissory note is a “nullity.”). See supra note 128.
Interestingly, the court also cited a New York decision in support of the proposition that “MERS does
not have the authority, in its capacity as ‘nominee’ for the lender on a Mortgage, to assign the note to a
third party.” Weymouth, No. RE-09-015, at 2 (citing LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Lamy, 824 N.Y.S.2d
769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Aug. 7, 2006)).
246. See, e.g., HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n v. Davis, No. RE-09-098, at 7 (Me. Dist. Ct., West
Bath, Mar. 19, 2010) (Field, J.); Wells Fargo Bank v. Clark, No. RE-08-295, at 2-3 (Me. Dist. Ct.,
Biddeford, June 9, 2009) (Douglas, J.). See also SunTrust Mortg., Inc. v. Humes, No. RE-08-196 (Me.
Dist. Ct., West Bath, Jan. 6, 2010) (Field, J.); LaSalle Bank v. Frye, No. RE-08-41 (Me. Dist. Ct., South
Paris, Jan. 14, 2009) (Cote, J.). In Davis, the District Court (West Bath, Field, J.) denied summary
judgment for the foreclosing party HSBC Bank and further held HSBC did not have standing to sue
where it was not assigned the promissory note or mortgage until after filing the complaint for
foreclosure. Davis, No. RE-09-098, at 7. Defendants Richard and June Davis executed a promissory
note to Accredited Home Lenders in November 2004, secured by a mortgage granted to MERS as
nominee to Accredited. Id. at 1. The Davises subsequently defaulted in January 2009. Id. Chase Home
Finance notified the Davises of default the following month. Id. HSBC filed a foreclosure action on
June 4, 2009. Id. Five days later MERS assigned its “interest” in the Davis mortgage and note to
HSBC. Id. HSBC then moved for summary judgment. Id. at 2. In denying summary judgment and
dismissing the case, the court refused to “assume physical possession of the original [n]ote and
[m]ortgage merely because copies of those instruments were attached to the [c]omplaint.” Id. at 4. The
court further ruled that the servicer Chase Home Finance provided defective notice of default to the
Davises, where the mortgage instrument required the “lender,” not the servicer, to deliver the notice of
default. Id. at 7. Finally, the court held that even if the lender had properly delivered the notice, it
would still have been defective because it failed to properly inform the Davises of their rights, including
their right to cure. Id.
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and (4) a failure to properly support an assertion of ownership of the note.247 All
contested at summary judgment, these cases illustrate the lower courts’ strict
scrutiny of the moving parties’ claims at summary judgment in foreclosure
proceedings, mirroring the Law Court’s decisions supporting this approach. These
cases also illustrate repeated failures by the foreclosing parties to efficiently adapt
their business practices to the relevant state law requirements for foreclosure
actions. These inefficiencies are further exemplified by several cases imposing
sanctions on the foreclosing party at mediation.248
The second challenge to achieving the FDP’s goals of fairness and efficiency,
specifically that of fairness, is revealed by the 2011 Judicial Branch Report to the
Maine Legislature, which indicates that although the foreclosing party is typically
represented at all stages of the foreclosure proceeding, only thirty-nine percent of
homeowners had legal representation at mediation.249 However, prior to the
mediation program, estimates indicate that less than ten percent of all homeowners
facing foreclosure enjoyed representation by counsel.250 Furthermore, prior to
implementation of the mediation program, the mortgagor did not contest seventy

247. See, e.g., Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Cormiea, No. RE-10-259 (Me. Dist. Ct., Biddeford, Mar. 8,
2011) (dismissing a foreclosure action without prejudice where the foreclosing party failed to comply
with the title 14, section § 6321 of the Maine Revised Statutes requirements that the foreclosing party
attach certain documents to the complaint, including proof of possession of the note and mortgage and
evidence of compliance with the statutory notice requirements). See also Jaenisch, No. RE-09-23; U.S.
Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Hartman, No. RE-08-026 (Me. Dist. Ct., Augusta, May 11, 2009) (Mulhern, J.);
Aurora Loan Servs. LLC v. Simpson, No. RE-08-127 (Me. Dist. Ct., Wiscasset, Apr. 16, 2009) (Hjelm,
J.); CountryWide Home Loans, Inc. v. D’Amico, No. RE-07-204 (Me. Dist. Ct., Biddeford, Dec. 3,
2008) (O’Neil, J.); PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Mosher, No. RE-08-10 (Me. Dist. Ct., Farmington, May 6,
2008). In D’Amico, the District Court (Biddeford, O’Neil, J.) denied foreclosing party CountryWide
Home Loans’ motion for summary judgment where it failed to adequately prove it was the holder of the
promissory note or that the defendant was in default on the note. D’Amico, No. RE-07-204, at 2. The
court noted that CountryWide had only submitted a sworn affidavit with attached proof of assignment of
the note to prove it was in fact the holder of the note, but the mortgage indicated its holder was another
company. Id. The court, therefore, held that CountryWide “cannot demand payment on a note it does
not hold.” Id. Although CountryWide attempted to correct this problem by mailing a different version
of the promissory note to the court and asking the court to attach this document to the affidavit, the court
refused to attach the second version of the note, finding this would “destroy the integrity of a sworn
affidavit by illegally attaching a different document to it than was sworn to by the affiant.” Id. The
court further found that CountryWide failed to properly prove the defendant was in default where its
sworn affidavit alleged default but was not supported by any business record proving default. Id. Thus,
the court found that the affidavit was inadmissible hearsay under Maine Rule of Evidence 803(6) and
therefore could not be considered for purposes of summary judgment under Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(e). Id. Rule 56(e) states that “affidavits . . . shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence.”
248. See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. v. Richardson, 2011 ME 38, ¶¶ 1, 5, 15 A.3d 756 (imposing sanctions
where the foreclosing party’s representative repeatedly failed to attend scheduled mediation sessions and
failed to offer a credible justification). See also CitiMortgage v. Dente, No. RE-10-215 (Me. Dist. Ct.,
Biddeford, May 20, 2011) (Cantara, J.) (imposing sanctions where the foreclosing party failed to present
requested forms at mediation and where the foreclosing party was not forthcoming regarding whether
the homeowner qualified for HAMP or other modifications).
249. 2011 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 21, at 3. Forty-nine percent of homeowners participating in
mediation received some help in filling out the financial forms and worksheets required at mediation.
Id.
250. Foreclosed Justice, supra note 8, at 294.
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percent of foreclosure actions, generally resulting in summary judgment.251 This
trend appears to have largely continued despite mediation.252 In sum, although
mediation has provided solutions for a minority of parties, it appears that
foreclosure actions in Maine continue to be dominated by unrepresented litigants,
unanswered complaints, and uncontested summary judgment orders for the
mortgagee.
The low incidence of legal representation for defaulting parties in foreclosure
actions may carry some relation to the foreclosing parties’ consistent failure to
prove a beneficiary interest in the note in cases where summary judgment is
contested. Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 56(h)(4) requires that the court in
uncontested cases admit the foreclosing party’s statement of material fact if
supported by proper record citations,253 a lesson pro se litigant Brian Harp learned
the hard way in JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Harp, where Harp failed to timely
contest the late assignment of the mortgage to JPMorgan.254 Thus, as Harp
demonstrates, uncontested foreclosure actions result in less scrutiny of the
foreclosing party’s assertions and record citations, allowing the foreclosing party to
win on summary judgment without its assertions and the underlying record proof of
these assertions being fully tested by the adversary system.
Because uncontested foreclosure actions are not fully tested by the adversary
process, there is no way to know with empirical certainty whether, if contested,
uncontested foreclosure actions would suffer from the same sorts of failures of
proof as evident in contested cases.255 However, anecdotal evidence and inference
strongly suggest that similar documentation problems may often exist in
uncontested cases. For example, in testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee, Volunteer Lawyers Project attorney Thomas Cox stated that in his
extensive experience with foreclosure summary judgment motions handled by
PTLA and MASH,256 foreclosure defense attorneys prevailed approximately
seventy-five percent of the time in blocking summary judgment for the foreclosing
party.257 Likewise, the nationwide incidence of reliance on faulty lender affidavits
251. 2009 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 17, at 18.
252. In 2010, there were 5,409 new foreclosure filings. 2011 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 21, at 2.
Given that mediation was only conducted in 983 cases and that mediation is triggered merely by filling
out and returning the one-page answer form provided to the mortgagor by the foreclosing party when
notice of the foreclosure complaint is filed, it would appear that most mortgagors fail to respond to the
complaint, suggesting that most foreclosure actions continue to go uncontested..
253. ME. R. CIV. P. 56(h)(4) (stating “[f]acts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of
material facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless
properly controverted. An assertion of fact set forth in a statement of material facts shall be followed by
a citation to the specific page or paragraph of identified record material supporting the assertion. The
court may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material properly
considered on summary judgment.”).
254. See 2011 ME 5, ¶ 19, 10 A.3d 718; see also supra, Part III.C.
255. Additionally, if no discovery is ever performed in uncontested summary judgment motions,
defendants never develop records that to rebut moving parties’ statements of material fact.
256. MASH is a group of approximately sixty attorneys in Maine dedicated to providing Maine
homeowners with pro bono legal assistance. Foreclosed Justice, supra note 8, at 293.
257. Id. at 294. While screening may in part explain this high success rate, it is not unreasonable to
surmise that these successful oppositions to summary judgment indicate the likely unsoundness of a
significant percentage of uncontested summary judgment motions.
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revealed in Bradbury provides further evidence of the widespread unsoundness of
at least one necessary element (the lender affidavit) for summary judgment in many
states, including Maine.258
Thus, the combination of a high incidence of pro se foreclosure defendants and
the foreclosing parties’ repeated failures to prove their cases at summary judgment
in contested cases raises significant concerns about the integrity of the foreclosing
parties’ conduct in foreclosure proceedings and the prevalence of basic
documentation deficiencies. At the same time, the mediation program has
demonstrated some success in diverting cases away from foreclosure, thus saving
judicial resources and providing the parties with an agreeable alternative to
foreclosure. This avoids the lose-lose situation the Judicial Report warned of in
2009259 by keeping homeowners in their homes while also allowing lenders to
recover their investment without excessive litigation fees. It therefore follows that
mediation should continue to be required whenever feasible to avoid the expenses
and perils litigation has proven to carry for both homeowners and lenders alike.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE FORECLOSURE DIVERSION PROGRAM
A. The Argument for a Broad Interpretation of the Good Faith Requirement
Historically, the Law Court has affirmed the trial court’s authority to exercise
its equitable powers “[w]hen necessary for the adjustment of equities between
mortgagor and mortgagee.”260 While the adoption of the Maine Rules of Civil
Procedure affected a merger of law and equity, the “right to a specific kind of legal
or equitable relief upon proof of certain facts” remained unchanged.261 Several
courts around the country have relied on the court’s equity power, the doctrine of
unclean hands, and statutory good faith requirements in sanctioning the foreclosing
parties’ bad faith conduct during mediation.262 While these cases raise some
analogies to Maine’s good faith requirement in foreclosure mediation, Maine courts

258. See Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc. v. Bradbury, No. RE-09-65, at 4 (Me. Dist. Ct., Bridgton, Sept. 24,
2010) (Powers, J.); Streitfeld, supra note 1.
259. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
260. Woodman v. Freeman, 25 Me. 531, 547 (1846) (citing Pratt v. Law, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 456
(1815)).
261. Greenlaw v. Rodick, 158 Me. 440, 444, 185 A.2d 895, 897 (1962).
262. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Mathon, No. 2007-30481, 2010 WL 4910164 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec.
1, 2010) (denying judgment in foreclosure for the mortgagee and scheduling a hearing to determine the
mortgagee’s good faith based on the grounds of the mortgagee’s unclean hands in seeking foreclosure
after accepting thirteen modification payments in accordance with a modification agreement signed by
both parties); BAC Home Loans Servicing v. Westervelt, No. 2455/10, 2010 WL 4702276 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Nov. 18, 2010) (denying foreclosure for the mortgagee, barring the foreclosing party from collecting
further fees from the defendant, and sua sponte finding that the mortgagee acted in bad faith in refusing
to follow HAMP guidelines binding on the mortgagee and in failing to appear at mediation or offer an
adequate excuse for absence); Wells Fargo Bank v. Hughes, 897 N.Y.S.2d 605, 633-34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2010) (dismissing the foreclosure action without prejudice on the basis of the mortgagee’s unclean
hands where the mortgagee proposed a modification agreement rife with subprime lending
characteristics contrary to New York legislation, and refused to revise the terms of the modification
agreement at the court’s request).
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act with clear statutory authority to require that the parties mediate in good faith.263
However, the Law Court has not yet had occasion to pass on the proper
interpretation of the good faith requirement.264 Meanwhile, the lower courts appear
to have rarely found that the foreclosing party failed to participate in mediation in
good faith.265
This Comment proposes that the goals of the Foreclosure Diversion Program
will be further served, and the incidence of successful mediation may be increased,
by strict enforcement of the foreclosing parties’ compliance with a broad and
clearly articulated interpretation of the good faith requirement of title 14, section
6321 of the Maine Revised Statutes and Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 93(j).266
To achieve effective foreclosure diversion, both parties must be held to a high
standard of conduct and urged to approach mediation willing and able to fully
participate and negotiate a meaningful resolution whenever possible. Given the
costs of foreclosure to all parties, the courts should be wary of foreclosing parties
that fail to make meaningful efforts to mediate, particularly in cases in which the
defendant is unrepresented and thus does not have full command of the normal
adversarial safeguards. Careful scrutiny of the mortgagee’s efforts to mediate is
further necessitated by the documented incentive arrangements of many servicers,
which often discourage mediation while encouraging delays and ultimately
foreclosure, even when not in the investor’s financial best interest.267
By sending a clear message to the foreclosing party that a meaningful effort to
reach a negotiated solution will be required at mediation, mediators and the courts
can further encourage mutually agreeable negotiated resolutions. Meaningful
mediation will also serve the protective function envisioned by the Law Court in
Harp by subjecting the foreclosing party to “careful scrutiny for compliance with
all procedural prerequisites at the outset of litigation” while saving precious
judicial resources by avoiding time-consuming summary judgment
determinations.268 By requiring strict compliance with the good faith requirement
and heeding the Law Court’s advice in Harp, trial courts can nudge the foreclosing
263. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6321-A(12) (2011); see also ME. R. CIV. P. 93(j). At the same time,
any expansion of the good faith requirement must necessarily be constrained by the mediation program
requirement that mediation may not act as a waiver of either party’s rights. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §
6321-A(5) (2011).
264. See Bank of N.Y. v. Richardson, 2011 ME 38, ¶¶ 1. 5, 15 A.3d 756 (declining to address the
trial court’s imposition of sanctions and dismissal with prejudice of the foreclosing party’s action where
the dismissal of the bank’s claim was not a final judgment as to all asserted claims in that case).
265. See 2011 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 21, at 5 (noting that four mediation cases have resulted
in sanctions against the foreclosing party). The imposition of sanctions may or may not indicate a
finding of bad faith, but a finding of bad faith would likely include the imposition of sanctions.
266. While clearly the court must require good faith by both parties, given the conduct of the
foreclosing parties over the last several years, it appears that strict application of the good faith
requirement will most frequently subject the foreclosing party to scrutiny and, in appropriate cases,
sanctions. This Comment in no way proposes that the mortgagor should be immune from the good faith
requirement nor should the mortgagor be subject to a less stringent good faith standard. However, this
Comment proceeds on the premise that given the current challenges facing the Foreclosure Diversion
Program, strict enforcement of the good faith requirement against the foreclosing party provides a
promising vehicle to further the goals of the Program.
267. See supra Part II.B.
268. JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Harp, 2011 ME 5, ¶ 12 n.5, 10 A.3 718.
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parties toward a mutually agreeable resolution to avoid foreclosure. This includes
providing clear incentives for accepting a negotiated solution at mediation for those
foreclosing parties that may be unable to prove their cases at summary judgment,
which in turn will promote fairness and efficiency for all parties involved.
B. What Good Faith Should Mean in the Foreclosure Mediation Context
First, Maine law already requires that “[e]ach party and each party’s attorney,
if any, must be present at mediation . . . and shall make a good faith effort to
mediate all issues.”269
Likewise, the law provides that the mortgagee’s
representative who participates in the mediation session must have the authority to
accept a mutually agreeable negotiated solution.270 In addition, the mortgagee is
required by statute to provide the homeowner with contact information for a
representative authorized to modify or otherwise approve a negotiated solution to
the action.271 The mediator and the court can give force to these provisions by
carefully monitoring the mortgagee’s participation in mediation sessions and
evaluating the actual authority the mortgagee’s representative has to negotiate with
the homeowner and accept proposals that arise from the mediation. Where the
mortgagee’s representative fails to attend mediation and also fails to present a
reasonable explanation for that absence, or else fails to make a properly authorized
representative available to negotiate with the homeowner and fully consider any
reasonable negotiated agreement modifying the loan, the mediator should include
this information in the mediator’s report to the court as indicia of bad faith, and the
appropriateness of sanctions should be considered.272 Lack of authority to accept a
proposal in mediation should generally not be reason for the foreclosing party to
reject the proposal or otherwise delay mediation.273
Second, in order for mediation to occur, the parties’ relationships to the note
and mortgage must be clear, as this bears directly on the parties’ authority to accept
any modification. Where the foreclosing party appearing at the mediation session
has not provided proof of ownership of the note and mortgage upon filing the
269. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6321-A(12) (2011). See also ME. R. CIV. P. 93(j).
270. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6321-A(11)(A) (2011).
271. Id. § 6111(1-A)(E).
272. See Bank of N.Y. v. Richardson, 2011 ME 38, ¶ 1, 15 A.3d 756. In addition, the Nevada
Supreme Court has ruled that where the foreclosing party does not make a representative with the power
to modify the loan available at mediation, that party must be subject to sanctions. Pasillas v. HSBC
Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281, 1283 (Nev. 2011).
273. Fairness would be encouraged by particular scrutiny of any unreasonable delay by the
foreclosing party where delay in the foreclosure process often means increased fee collection
opportunities for the servicer. See supra Part II.B. Furthermore, while Maine Rule of Civil Procedure
93(j) provides a host of options that the court may consider in imposing sanctions, the court should
consider the ultimate goal of ensuring a resolution to the foreclosure action while deterring any bad
faith. Insofar as Rule 93 authorizes the court to consider dismissal without prejudice or dismissal
without prejudice with a prohibition on refilling the foreclosure action for a stated period of time, the
court should carefully consider the effect this will have on both parties, particularly on the homeowner
where dismissal will likely not resolve the underlying reasons for the homeowner’s original default and
may cause the homeowner to continue to incur fee obligations to the mortgagor after dismissal. As
such, the net result of dismissal without prejudice will likely be that the foreclosing party is forced to
refile the foreclosure action, thus increasing transaction costs for all parties, including the court, while
not furthering any resolution to the foreclosure action.
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complaint as required by title 14, section 6321 of the Maine Revised Statutes, and
the foreclosing party is unwilling or unable to produce the relevant documents to
comply with section 6321, this failure should be noted in the mediator’s report as
indicia of bad faith, and sanctions should be considered.274
Third, the homeowner is required to present a host of financial information to
the mortgagee prior to the mediation session.275 It follows that the mortgagee’s
representative should be required to have reasonable personal knowledge of this
information, including the homeowner’s payment history, current income, the
current appraisal value of the property in question, and the applicability of any
available loss mitigation programs. The mortgagee’s representative should also be
prepared to timely act on that information to avoid delays due to staleness of
financial data. Likewise, the mortgagee’s representative should have personal
knowledge of any known restrictions on accepting a negotiated solution provided
by investor agreements or other agreements binding on the foreclosing party,
including sufficient knowledge of the relevant provisions of those agreements to
describe and explain those restrictions. Where the mortgagee’s representative
participates in mediation without a reasonable basis of personal knowledge of this
information, the goals of requiring this pre-mediation exchange of information are
defeated. Where the mortgagee’s representative clearly lacks this basic level of
personal knowledge and does not possess the provided documentation of this
information that would serve as personal knowledge, the mediator’s report should
take this into account, and the court should consider appropriate sanctions absent a
reasonable justification by the mortgagee.276
Fourth, where the net present value calculation and the homeowner’s income
data indicate that it is in the mortgagee’s financial interest to modify, modification
is presumed to be in both parties’ financial best interest unless the foreclosing party
raises reasonable grounds for rejecting modification and provides specific
documentation of those grounds.277 A reasonable justification shall include proof
of the specific provisions of a valid pooling or securitization agreement or other
valid agreement binding on the foreclosing party that restricts or prohibits the

274. Nevada law requires production of documents proving ownership of the note and mortgage at
mediation. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.086(4) (2011). The Nevada Supreme Court has held that where
the foreclosing party fails to provide these documents at mediation, the foreclosure action cannot
proceed, and sanctions are appropriate. Leyva v. Nat’l Default Servicing Co., 255 P.3d 1275, 1276-77
(Nev. 2011); Pasillas, 255 P.3d, at 1283. The Nevada Supreme Court’s ruling requiring sanctions
where the foreclosing party fails to provide this proof is analogous to those situations in Maine in which
the foreclosing party does not provide the documents required by title 14, section 6321 of the Maine
Revised Statutes upon filing the complaint and subsequently fails to produce these documents at
mediation.
275. See ME. R. CIV. P. 93(c)(4), (5).
276. At least one Maine District Court judge has already found that the foreclosing party is obliged to
produce investor guidelines when the foreclosing party argues that those guidelines restrict the sorts of
modifications the foreclosing party can accept yet alleges that the guidelines are confidential and
therefore cannot be produced. HSBC Bank USA v. Bowie, No. RE-09-080, at 4 (Me. Dist. Ct., York,
Mar. 3, 2011) (Douglas, J.).
277. HAMP already requires that the mortgagee accept the result of the net present value calculation,
where other HAMP requirements are met. See supra Part II.C.
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proposed modification or any other contemplated negotiated solution.278 Where the
mortgagee fails to accept the result of the net present value calculation and fails to
provide any reasonable justification for refusing to do so, including failing to
provide any relevant documents that verify this justification, this should be noted in
the mediator’s report as indicia of bad faith and the court should consider sanctions
where appropriate.
Fifth and finally, while it may appear obvious, the mediator’s report should
take into account any unreasonable delay the foreclosing party creates in the
mediation process. This includes delays in any required exchange of documents or
in making available a representative who is authorized to accept a negotiated
solution to the foreclosure action. Likewise, where the foreclosing party initially
accepts a trial modification agreement through mediation but unreasonably delays
making that modification permanent and dismissing the foreclosure action after the
agreed-upon trial period has been completed, and the foreclosing party is unable to
justify that delay, the mediator’s report should make note of this delay and the
court should consider whether the foreclosing party has acted in bad faith. Where
delay is apparent, and no reasonable justification for that delay is forthcoming, the
court should consider appropriate sanctions.279
VI. CONCLUSION
As this Comment has illustrated, Maine’s mediation program has demonstrated
significant success in providing a fair and efficient alternative to foreclosure that
potentially allows the homeowner to remain in the home, maximizes the investor’s
return on the original investment, and relieves some of the burden placed on the
court system posed by time-consuming summary judgment motions. However, the
success of foreclosure diversion has been challenged by a variety of factors,
including the mortgagee’s own documentation problems and the pro se status of
many homeowner-litigants. Against this backdrop, strict scrutiny of summary
judgment motions in foreclosure has proven crucial in ensuring fairness in the
foreclosure process. By empowering mediators and judges to carefully monitor the
mortgagee’s good faith at mediation based on clear, predictable, and realistic
criteria, the FDP can build on the success of the mediation program to date and
continue to function as a model for other mediation programs around the country.
As a last note, Bradbury, Saunders, and many other foreclosure cases
demonstrate that the procedural fairness of the foreclosure process has relied
heavily on the work of highly qualified volunteer and nonprofit attorneys who
understand the foreclosure process in Maine. Absent the dedication of these
attorneys, the robo-signing uncovered in Bradbury may never have been
discovered in Maine, and MERS lack of standing in Maine Courts might never
have been successfully challenged. These are just two of many important
contributions by volunteer and nonprofit attorneys, yet the Bradbury and Saunders
278. This requirement would comply with one Maine District Court judge’s interpretation of the
good faith provision to require that the foreclosing party produce investor guidelines alleged by the
party to restrict its ability to accept a modification based on the net present value calculation. Bowie,
No. RE-09-080, at 4.
279. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(j) provides a nonexclusive list of possible sanctions.

284

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1

cases are exemplary because they both contributed to national measures to correct
improper practices found to be rampant in foreclosure cases.280 Competent
representation has likewise proven important in the mediation context.281 Thus,
continued support for the representation of indigent litigants is vital to the success
of the mediation program going forward,282 and to ensure that the adversary process
adequately tests the strength of foreclosure actions against Maine homeowners.
Indeed, the integrity of our system of justice depends upon it.

280. See, e.g., ElBoghdady, supra note 15 (reporting that federal regulators reached consent
agreements with the nation’s largest mortgage lenders to correct improper practices such as the use of
robo-signers); Streitfeld, supra note 1.
281. See Foreclosed Justice, supra note 8, at 309.
282. For an excellent articulation of the need for increased access to counsel for low-income
individuals facing civil litigation, see the Honorable Jonathan Lippman’s A Proactive Judicial Branch:
Confronting the Crisis of the Unrepresented, 2011 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 1.

